Armenian
News Network / Groong
Guests
Hosts
Introduction
Hello,
and welcome to the Armenian News Network, Groong,
Week in Review. This show was recorded on Monday, April 11, 2022.
This week we’re
going to talk about the following major topics:
●
Opposition Protests in Yerevan
●
Buying Bread from a Man in Brussels
●
Working for the man
●
War and the Armenian Economic Outlook
●
New MPG polls on Ukraine,
Artsakh
●
Alison in Artsakh
To talk about
these issues, we have with us:
Hrant
Mikaelian, a political scientist and multidisciplinary researcher in social
sciences based in Yerevan. He is also a senior researcher at the Caucasus
Institute; AND
Alison Tahmizian
Meuse, a veteran journalist
who has reported for major international publications including Agence France-Presse and NPR. She currently teaches at the
American University of Armenia and is a strategic advisor for the New
Delhi-based consultancy DeepStrat.
Topics This Week
Opposition Protests in Yerevan
On Tuesday the
two parliamentary opposition alliances, Hayastan and I Have Honor rallied thousands of supporters to demand that the Armenian
government not concede territories and control over Artsakh in meetings with
the Azerbaijani president in Brussels.
There have been a
few large rallies since the elections in June 2021 that changed nothing in
Armenia since the defeat of 2020.
The protest
organizers put forth a list
of 8 demands from the Nikol Pashinyan government,
which were:
● to affirm that the Republic of Armenia is the
guarantor of the security of the people of Artsakh and transition to the
realization of the right to self-determination with all its components,
● to exclude any status of Artsakh within
Azerbaijan,
● to exclude the enclave state of Artsakh without
a reliable land connection with Armenia,
● take steps in order to resume the negotiation
process in accordance with the goals set by the decision of the 1994 OSCE
Summit,
● to exclude the provision of corridors under the
guise of unblocking the means of communication at the expense of the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of Armenia,
● exclude the signing of any interstate agreement,
any delimitation and demarcation process in the conditions of use of force by
Azerbaijan under the threat of use of force,
● not to sign any agreement with Azerbaijan that
would violate Artsakh's right to self-determination without restrictions,
● to rule out any agreement in Armenia-Turkey
relations that would call into question the reality of the Armenian people 's
deportation and genocide, as well as their right to be the bearer of the
Armenian cultural and cultural heritage.
What impressions
did the protest leave
The opposition
said that this protest was only the first step and that more events will
follow, but so far nothing. Essentially, the protesters were told to go home
and wait.
There seems to be
growing discontent among Pashinyan’s critics that the
opposition is slow to move, while opposition leaders accuse them of impatience.
What was achieved
at these rallies?
Buying Bread from a Man in Brussels
The rallies were
held on the eve of PM Pashinyan’s meeting with Azerbaijan president Aliyev, which were
held under the auspices of EC president Charles Michel.
Aliyev wants to
force a peace treaty based on the five principles he put out a month ago.
Pashinyan and FM Ararat Mirzoyan have indicated that these points are largely
acceptable to them, but that further points are missing from the agenda.
The Armenian
opposition, needless to say, is deeply suspicious of Pashinyan’s
objectives during the Brussels negotiations.
At the meeting,
Pashinyan and Aliyev agreed to start drafting a “peace agreement” and also convening a joint border
commission before the end of April 2022.
Notes (from Ashotyan and more):
● Artsakh was never mentioned. OSCE MG not brought
up. In fact, none of the 8 points demanded by the opposition were followed.
● Azeri incursions and killings, either in Artsakh
or Armenia, were not mentioned. Pashinyan said that he didn’t find it
“appropriate” to raise the issue since it happened in the area of
responsibility of Russian peacekeepers
● Azerbaijan’s terrorism via blowing up natural
gas and heating was not mentioned.
● The issue of Armenian POWs and Azerbaijani
Missing Persons from the first war in Artsakh, apparently now have similar
status.
● Increased legitimacy for the “mirror retreat”
idiotic concept by Pashinyan.
● The following day, during the visit of Ararat
Mirzoyan to Moscow, Lavrov said that France and US are “canceling” the OSCE MG
by refusing to communicate on the topic. He furthermore added:
“If they are ready to sacrifice the interests -- in this case of the Armenian
side -- of settlement in Nagorno-Karabakh and the South Caucasus as a whole,
it’s their choice.” Is the OSCE MG collapsing, in light of Lavrov’s
sensational remarks?
● In response to repeated statements by Pashinyan
and his team that there should be an investigation into the actions of the
peacekeepers, Lavrov offered a dismissive but diplomatic reply, saying that the
calls for an internal investigation into the peacekeeping contingent’s
activities, do not reflect the “real attitude of the Armenian people and the
leadership of Armenia.”
● Armenia was the only CSTO country to not vote
AGAINST Russia’s expulsion from the UN HRC. Earlier, Russia had circulated a note among UN members threatening “consequences” for
failure to vote against. Was this issue broached in the meeting with Lavrov?
What was achieved
in Brussels?
Working For The Man
Alison, the last
time you were on our show back in November ‘21, you talked about the possibility of
contributing to Armenia in an advisory capacity. Can you tell us what you’ve
been up to since then?
War and Armenian Economic Outlook
The economic
effects of the war in Ukraine are already having reverberations in many
countries around the world.
Just to give you
an idea, Ukraine and Russia account for a significant
percentage of the world’s exports of wheat and fertilizer. The war and
sanctions have stunted the production and logistics of delivering these goods
to global markets. This is already having an effect on global food prices, and
this is set to continue.
Armenia is not
immune to these issues despite being a member of the EAEU. We know that Russia
has restricted the export of grains even to EAEU countries.
It is now spring
and the season to fertilize the ground and plant seeds. We’ve seen isolated
reports of farmers complaining about the cost-prohibitiveness of fertilizer already,
but the government is eerily silent on such a major issue.
Is Armenia’s food
security at risk, and can it withstand existing and even bigger economic shocks
that may yet come?
The IMF has
already changed its forecast of global growth from 3.6% to 2.6%. And amidst the
double-figure inflation plaguing Armenian consumers, this week we got news that
Armenia’s foreign trade increased 52.4% year-over-year for the first
two months of this year to $1.4 Billion. Exports grew 40% to $503 Million,
while imports grew 60% to $903 Million.
Imports grew
significantly faster than exports and this leaves us with a $400 Million
deficit in just 2 months of ‘22.
● What is the economic outlook for Armenia?
● Is there hope to overcome the trade deficit? When
and how?
New MPG Polls on Ukraine
The results of a new MPG poll were released this week, related to the conflict in Ukraine.
Sentiments on War in Ukraine
The poll conducted last week asks a variety of questions to gauge Armenians sentiments about the war in Ukraine, but in summary we can say that the Armenian population is overwhelmingly aware of the war and the potential for it to affect the region and the majority seem to support Russia’s position, including the recognition of independence of Donetsk and Lugansk (65.3%). The respondents seem to be aware also that this is not a Ukraine vs. Russia conflict but a US vs. Russia conflict and this will have repercussions on Armenia as well (77.6%).
Are these numbers surprising? Do any nuances stand out?
Who is to blame for Karaglukh?
There was an interesting question in the poll about “whom do you blame for the tense situation in Artsakh”:
● 43.8% said Azerbaijan
● 27.0% said Armenian government
● 14.1% said Russian peacekeepers
● 6.1% said Artsakh government
● And only 3.5% said Turkey
The government in Yerevan has been trying to put the blame on the Russian peacekeepers. Is it surprising that only 14.1% of Armenians in Armenia believe that thesis?
Alison: You just came back from Artsakh. What is your sense of the population there? Whom do they blame for the incidents?
Karaglukh is not an isolated incident and people see further proof with each passing day that the current Armenian government has washed its hands of Artsakh Republic. And I do not believe they are willing to blame the peacekeepers, because you have had almost the same scenario in places like Kapan or the Goris-Kapan road, part of Armenia’s crucial highway to Iran, where Armenian troops are replaced by Azeri troops. This was in the Republic of Armenia, where there were no Russian peacekeepers to blame. And the only response of the Armenian government is to downplay the severity of these concessions, or to accuse those raising the alarm of stoking panic.
The summary of events I heard when I was in Stepanakert was that there was indeed an agreement for both sides to pull back, and that the Russians were to take the heights, and that when the Azeris simply rushed in, the Russians did fight back and succeeded in preventing them from bringing heavy weaponry up the heights. I was also told that a Russian peacekeeper was badly injured because this intervention was man-to-man, as the Russians have no mandate for the use of deadly force. And I think we have to remember that the Russian troops were the ones who came when even the Armenian government was willing to concede defeat and had evacuated Stepanakert.
Armenia-Turkey and Armenia-Azerbaijan Relations
We’ve had several polls in the past (both by IRI and MPG) which indicated that a majority of the population is not really keen on establishing diplomatic relations with Turkey. Despite this, there were still manipulations of these polls. Most recently, Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan stated in March that Armenia’s population supports the current efforts of the Armenian government, which says that it is normalizing relations with Turkey “without preconditions” (never mind that most if not all preconditions have been met already).
MPG asked the question point blank: “Do you support the establishment of diplomatic relations and opening of borders with Turkey without preconditions?” A staggering 68% said that they were against this, with 59.3 saying they were categorically against this.
How should we interpret these results?
Another question asked: “Will the current Armenian authorities be able to sign a peace agreement with Azerbaijan on terms acceptable and in the interests of Armenia and Nagorno Karabakh?”
Again, a resounding 57.2% said that “somewhat no” or “definitely no”. So, it seems that on the issue of international relations, many Armenian citizens are pessimistic about Armenia’s current direction and the team leading it.
Do we agree with this?
Support for Pashinyan
Now we come to the paradoxical part of this poll. Let’s begin with the approval rating given to the prime minister.
The respondents were asked: “Please rate the performance of Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan”
● 38.8% positive (with 25% definitely positive)
● 47.7% negative (with 34.1% definitely negative)
● 13.6% difficulty in responding
The anti-rating seems to be high, but given the previous answers we’ve seen in this same poll, how can 38.8% still support this prime minister?
If his foreign policy is going in completely the wrong direction than the respondents want, what is he doing in other areas that is perhaps compensating for this?
Support for the Opposition
The last question in this poll asked: “If parliamentary elections were to be held this Sunday, who would you vote for?”
● 20.4% said Civil Contract
● 12.0% said Armenia Alliance or I Have Honor Alliance (8.3 + 3.7)
● 9.1% refused to answer the question
● 12.9% said they find it difficult to respond
● 38.9% said either:
○ None of the above 10.1%
○ Will not participate in elections 28.8%
Just for reference, a week before the June 2021 parliamentary elections, Civil Contract had 23.8% while Hayastan Alliance had 24.1% according to this same pollster.
How can we explain these results?
Charts
Տեղյա՞կ եք արդյոք, որ Ռուսաստանը ճանաչել է Լուգանսկի Ժողովրդական Հանրապետությունը եւ Դոնեցկի Ժողովրդական Հանրապետությունը
Ինչպե՞ս եք վերաբերվում Ռուսաստանի կողմից Լուգանսկի Ժողովրդական Հանրապետության եւ Դոնեցկի Ժողովրդական Հանրապետության անկախության ճանաչմանը
Ձեր կարծիքով արդյոք Հայասատանը պետք է ճանաչի Լուգանսկի եւ Դոնբասի անկախ հանրապետությունները
Արդյոք
կարծու՞մ եք, որ Ռուսաստանի ռազմական
գործողությունները Ուկրաինայում
արդարացի են
Համաձա՞յն եք արդյոք, որ ուկրաինական հակամարտությունն իրականում հակամարտություն է ԱՄՆ-ի եւ Ռուսաստանի միջեւ
Ձեր կարծիքով Ռուս Ուկրաինական հակամարտությունը կհանգեցնի՞ աշխարհակարգում գլոբալ փոփոխությունների
Ձեր կարծիքով, Ռուսաստանի դեմ Արեւմուտքի պատժամիջոցները ազդու՞մ են Հայաստանի վրա
Ըստ Ձեզ, ո՞վ է մեղավոր Արցախում ստեղծված լարված իրավիճակի համար
Ասացեք խնդրեմ, Դուք կո՞ղմ եք Թուրքիայի հետ առանց նախապայմաններ դիվանագիտական հարաբերությունների հաստատմանը եւ սահմանների բացմանը
ՀՀ ներկա իշխանությունները ունակ կլինե՞ն ՀՀ եւ Լեռնային Ղարաբաղի շահերից բխող եւ ընունելի պայմաններով խաղաղության պայմանագիր կնքել Ադրբեջանի հետ
Գնահատեք խնդրեմ ՀՀ վարչապետ Նիկոլ Փաշինյանի գործելաոճը
Եթե առաջիկա կիրակի օրը լինեին Խորհրդարանական ընտրություններ, ո՞ր կուսակցության կամ դաշինքի օգտին կքվեարկեիք
Alison in Artsakh
And now, I’m sure all of our listeners are eager to hear a word about Artsakh. Alison, you were there over the weekend. Tell us about your impressions of your first visit since the war in Artsakh.
● Were there a lot of visitors from Armenia?
● What were the logistics like?
○ How did you secure transportation?
○ How was the road?
○ How did you book a hotel?
○ etc.
Wrap-up
That
was our Week in Review show, and we hope it helped you catch up with
some of the issues in and around Armenia from this past week. As always, we
invite your feedback and your suggestions. You can find us on most social media
and podcast platforms, or our website Groong.org.
Thanks
to Laura Osborn for the music on our podcasts. Don’t forget to subscribe to our
channel on YouTube, Like
our pages and follow us on social media. On behalf of everyone in this episode,
we wish you a good week, thanks for listening and we’ll talk to you next week.
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Keywords
Hrant Mikaelian, Alison Tahmizian Meuse, Armenia, Artsakh, Nagorno Karabakh,
Karaglukh, Azerbaijan, Brussels, Charles Michel, MPG Poll, Karaglukh, Parukh, Vladimir Putin, South Caucasus, Turkey, Russia,
Peace Negotiations, Opposition, Yerevan, Protests, OSCE MG, Ararat Mirzoyan,
Ukraine, Armenian Economy, Economy, IMF, World Bank, Economic Slowdown,