Levon Zourabian was an advisor to the Republic of Armenia's President Levon Ter-Petrossian in 1991-1998 and acted as his press-secretary in 1994-1998. He is currently a Muskie fellow at Columbia University where this study was presented.
Armenian News Network / Groong
April 29, 2000
By Levon Zourabian
Yerevan, Armenia
On October 27th, 1999 five gunmen broke into the chamber of the National Assembly of Armenia during the weekly session of parliamentary inquiries addressed to the Government and opened fire. Within seconds they had killed the Prime Minister of Armenia as well as the Chairman of the Parliament, his two deputies and 4 other members of the Parliament and the Government, whose nearly total membership was present at the session. They also took the rest of the gathered MPs and ministers hostage. The video footage of the episode, broadcast live by National Armenian TV, was immediately distributed to all TV companies and shown in top news stories all over the world. A dumbfounded world could only guess at what was hidden behind this unprecedented tragedy. Political analysts all over the world (some of them claiming to be experts on regional issues) were able to produce only murky references to `ongoing turbulence in the country' that began with independence in 1991 after the collapse of the USSR and the war with Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh.
This explanation fit the stereotypical image of the Caucasus as a zone of conflict and civil disorder. Few people know, however, that during the period from 1991 up to those tragic events, Armenia had one of the best records of state-building, stable development and transitional reform in the CIS. That does not mean that the development was always smooth and calm. Tremendous threats to the national security of Armenia strongly affected the democratic transition of the country. In particular, they disproportionately increased the influence of the military elite and other security structures. There were also several serious political crises including one episode in September 1996 when a political demonstration turned violent and two-week martial law was imposed in order to ensure order in the capital. However, the effectiveness and cohesiveness of the executive power, the overall controllability of the country's internal situation, as well as the constitutional legitimacy of political processes never came close to being endangered to the extent that they were on October 27th. For anybody who is even minimally aware of Armenian internal politics, the shootings came as a complete shock. This notwithstanding, they represented a grave trial for the young democratic institutions of the country and had a tremendous impact on its political situation. In fact, the entire logic of development of domestic political processes has now changed because the assassinations have created a completely different political reality discontinuous with the preceding period.
Understanding of internal political processes in Armenia is extremely important within the context of the geopolitics of the Caspian region in so far as Armenia can play a substantial role in the politics of economic integration of post-Soviet Transcaucasia and Central Asia into the world economy. This study intends to fill a gap in the systematic analysis of Armenian internal politics and the influence it has on the prospects of the resolution of the Karabakh conflict.
The paper is based on my personal professional experience during my work in the presidential office in Armenia 1991-1998, the analysis of Armenian media from 1991 up to present days, an analysis of the programs and electoral platforms of main political parties and interviews with leading Armenian politicians and analysts during my stay in Armenia in January 2000, as well as information from diplomatic channels. For their invaluable discussions, I would like to thank particularly the first President of Armenia Levon Ter-Petrosian, the Chairman of the Constitutional Court Gagik Harutyunian, the Secretary of the National Security Council and the Chief of Staff of the President Serzh Sarksian, the Minister Chief of the Government Staff Shahen Karamanukian, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Armenia Vardan Oskanian, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Nagorno-Karabakh Republic Naira Melkumian, the Military Prosecutor Gagik Jahangirian, Advisor to the Prime-Minister Andranik Kocharian, the Head of the Information Department of the Government Tigran Hakobian, the former Chairman of the National Assembly Babken Ararktsian, the leader of the parliamentary majority Andranik Margarian, the Chairman of the `Erkrapah' Union Manvel Grigorian, the Chairman of People's Party Stepan Demirchian, the Chairman of the National Democratic Union Vazgen Manukian, the Chairman of the Armenian National Movement Vano Siradegian, the leader of the Union of the Constitutional Right Hrant Khachatrian, the former Chief National Security Adviser to the President Ashot Manucharian, former Chief National Security Adviser to the President Jirair Liparitian, former Mayor of Yerevan Vahag Khachatrian, the Head of the Presidential Press Service Hasmik Petrosian, the Director of the Center of Sociological Studies at the Science Academy Gevorg Poghosian, the former Adviser to President Aliyev of Azerbaijan Vafa Gulizade, the former Chief of Staff of the President of Azerbaijan Eldar Namazov.
I also want to express my gratitude to the Harriman Institute, which provided me with a PepsiCo travel grant for the research, particularly professors Mark Von Hagen and Robert Legvold for their help and encouragement. I would like also to thank Mr. Vahan Chamlian for his assistance, which enabled my travel to Armenia in the summer of 1999.
The main political factors that have defined the development of the present political situation in Armenia are the ongoing difficulties of state building and economic development due to the unresolved Karabakh conflict, the consequences of the four-year full-scale war with Azerbaijan from 1991-1994 and the blockade imposed by both Turkey and Azerbaijan on Armenia's ground communications with the external world.
In 1991, after the population of Armenia overwhelmingly voted for full independence from the USSR in a national referendum and the subsequent collapse of the USSR three months later, Armenia rose once again onto the world map as an independent country. Independence became one of the crucial parts of the political program of the Armenian National Movement (ANM), which initially emerged in 1988 as a nation-wide popular movement for unification with Karabakh. Eventually ANM expanded its agenda and transformed into a Solidarnost-like movement uniting different layers of Armenian society against the Communist rule in the struggle for democracy, establishment of a market economy and independence. The democratically-elected leaders of the new Armenia started to implement an ambitious program to build new Armenian statehood with very clear and widely-shared goals.
In foreign policy this meant, first of all, a rejection of any one-sided association with any of the world powers, (of course, Russia was implied mostly when the principle had to be made specific) - a revolutionary concept for traditional Armenian thought. Rather, the national security of Armenia was seen in the establishment of good relations with all neighboring countries and, especially, in the normalization of relations with a historical enemy - Turkey.
In domestic affairs, building effective democratic state institutions, adopting the Constitution, privatizing and developing the market economy infrastructure were declared to be the most important parts of liberal-democratic transformation of the country. Many of these ambitious goals have indeed been implemented with varying degrees of success. During 1991-1996 more than 90% of agricultural land, all the housing, as well as all the small and medium enterprises in the country were privatized. During these years prices on the majority of goods were liberalized and a market economy infrastructure was created.
In 1995 the Constitution of Armenia was adopted through a popular referendum, which in its main features is similar to the French Constitution. The process of building an independent judiciary and the radical transformation of the legal system have started according to the transitional concepts of the new Constitution. After the introduction of the national currency, a successful fiscal policy and newly-established mechanisms of financial regulation allowed the currency to remain viable and stable. As a result, the financial system of Armenia remained untouched by the dramatic financial crises in Russia despite close economic interconnectedness.
Armenia was also able to avoid the civil wars and instabilities that occurred in Russia and neighboring Georgia and Azerbaijan. Effective security structures were created, including the Army, which proved its effectiveness in a number of later wartime engagements, and the Interior Ministry, which was able to turn Armenia, flooded by criminal activities after the collapse of the Soviet law enforcement institutions, into a practically crime-free zone.
Despite all these successes, however, it quickly became clear that the subsequent implementation of the program as a whole would eventually be undermined by the geopolitical realities surrounding Armenia after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The Karabakh war distracted huge human and financial resources, and caused devastation and impoverishment in Armenia. The blockade of the ground communications imposed by Turkey and Azerbaijan also contributed to the tremendous decline of the Armenian economy, which was already affected negatively by the painful transformation from the Stalinist command-economy to a market one and the loss of old markets in the ex-USSR, as well as by several Russian crises. One of the most prosperous republics of the former Soviet Union, Armenia rapidly declined into poverty and mass unemployment.
Because of this the population gradually started losing its confidence in the implemented reforms. Shock therapy turned out to be `a shock without therapy'. Privatization proved to be largely ineffective, leaving hundreds of enterprises idle. Ideas of liberalism and even of independence were largely discredited as a result.
The concept of rapprochement with Turkey was also discredited. Despite the active efforts of Armenian diplomacy, the constantly changing Turkish governments continually rejected the Armenian proposals for unconditional establishment of diplomatic relations and development of economic cooperation, linking the improvement of Armenian-Turkish relations with the normalization of the Armenian-Azeri relations.
Wartime necessities also put enormous pressures on democratic rule and hindered the building of effective democratic institutions. The immense problem of corruption inherited from decades of Communist rule was further amplified by the catastrophic lack of resources for satisfying the minimal needs of the state bureaucracy and the absence of appropriate legislation.[1] As a result, the effectiveness of state institutions hinged upon the personal charisma of particular leaders and ministers rather than the traditions of civic governance, which created a fertile ground for abuses.
For example, there were abuses in the process of conscription of new recruits into the army, when the legal framework and the conscription procedures were in their infancy and were often violated by a large number of draftees. The legality of the state's handling of the problem was rather questionable: draft age men were on occasion rounded up in public areas and taken to mobilization centers. Financing the war also was problematic and its costs often significantly exceeded the resources available from public funds. To correct that situation, the security structures started controlling certain economic activities, which was tolerated by the civilian authorities despite obvious danger of abuses and embezzlement. In a situation where the young democratic state institutions were unable to meet pressing requirements of national security within the limits of the nascent legal framework of the newborn independent state, military expediency made the administration give special prerogatives to the security structures of the country.
All of these disproportionately increased the influence of the security structures, which made the task of navigating between military effectiveness and democratic rule extremely difficult for the civilian leadership. Nonetheless, Ter-Petrossian's administration was able to find the golden mean in the trade-off between deepening democratic development and rapid building of security structures. The necessary foundations for democratic rule were created and the functioning of basic democratic institutions was by and large secured, while meeting the requirements of national security.
In September 1996 Armenia held its second presidential elections.
Ter-Petrossian could claim credit for a number of achievements, including preserving Armenia's national security in a turbulent and dangerous period, liberating Karabakh, creating and maintaining order domestically, financial and macroeconomic stability, and economic growth in the two years following a cease-fire signed with Azerbaijan in 1994. On the other hand, burgeoning corruption and mass poverty had dramatically eroded his popularity. His achievements allowed him to win the elections (52% of the vote [2]), although the victory was far from convincing. The opposition, united around Vazgen Manoukian, the leader of the National Democratic Union, a party split from ANM in 1991, achieved unexpected success (40% of the vote). A number of irregularities had also taken place during the elections, which the opposition claimed were sufficient to reject the election's legitimacy. And Manoukian was able to achieve an impressive victory in Yerevan receiving 54% of the vote in the capital. Since Yerevan is disproportionately important in Armenia given its size (1/3 of the country's population resides there), and is the most politicized urban center in the country, the claims of the opposition were able to generate wide-spread doubts about the legitimacy of Ter-Petrossian's victory. Unfortunately for Armenian democracy, the opposition organized a violent attack on the Parliament building before an investigation into the alleged irregularities could be conducted. A subsequent investigation found the election results to be legitimate, and this conclusion was upheld by the Constitutional Court of the republic.[3]
This did not solve the problem of Ter-Petrossian's eroding popularity, however. The socioeconomic situation was not improving at a high enough pace and the population's disillusionment with liberal economic and political reforms continued to deepen. A growing segment of the society even started questioning the value of independent statehood.[4] Under those circumstances, Ter-Petrossian and his administration recognized the need for speeding up reforms and improving the socioeconomic conditions in the country at a more rapid pace. They also recognized more unequivocally something that Ter-Petrossian and his team had argued since the very beginning of assuming power - that these aims could not be achieved and Armenia could not develop without a lasting solution to the Karabakh conflict.
In particular, it was argued that for significant economic development to occur Armenia needs large foreign investments, which is impossible given that the country is deadlocked in conflict with Azerbaijan and is considered a high-risk zone by investors. Ter-Petrossian also argued that the blockade of Armenia by Turkey and Azerbaijan deprives Armenia of its most natural economic partners. It also makes transportation costs for Armenian goods substantially higher, which renders products manufactured in Armenia not competitive on the world markets. The lasting solution to the conflict became a first priority to the Ter-Petrossian's team.
The Armenian leadership embarked with renewed energy in 1997 on finding a compromise solution with Azerbaijan. The negotiations between Armenia, Azerbaijan and Karabakh sponsored by the Cochairmen of the so-called OSCE Minsk group (USA, Russia and France) had by this time reached two strategies for the peaceful settlement of the conflict. One was the so called `step-by-step' approach, which implied the withdrawal of Armenian forces from the occupied Azerbaijani territories beyond the Soviet boundaries of Karabakh,[5] lifting of the blockade imposed by Turkey and Azerbaijan on Armenia, signing a peace treaty and establishing diplomatic relations with Azerbaijan and Turkey in the initial stage. The peace agreement was supposed to be internationally guaranteed. The fate of the land corridor connecting Armenia with Karabakh and Karabakh's final status would have been left for the future, final stage of the negotiations, or in fact just postponed for an indefinite period of time. One could call this a `land for peace' formula.
The alternative strategy was the so-called `package deal,' according to which the resolution of all issues in dispute, including the final status of Karabakh, should be negotiated simultaneously in a single comprehensive agreement. As for what the status of Karabakh would be in a compromise agreement, the main idea floating around was the formula of `de jure a part of Azerbaijan, de facto independent,' which would be concretized in a list of special privileges granted to Karabakh. In contrast to the first approach, this one could be called a `land for status' formula. Both approaches were accepted by the Armenian leadership as frameworks for negotiations. However, irreconcilable differences soon emerged around the key elements of the status of Karabakh between the main parties to the conflict - Azerbaijan and Karabakh. Consequently, the `package' approach was abandoned and negotiations focused on the `step-by-step' approach.
However, finding a solution was not going to be an easy sell domestically. As the leadership started pressing harder for a compromise solution to the conflict with Azerbaijan, a large political cleavage in Armenia developed between the ruling ANM and the nationalists, which came to replace the cleavage between the ANM and the Communists or other Socialist conservatives. Old views of Armenia's relations with its neighbors, its political and geopolitical aspirations focusing on historical antagonisms with eternally hostile neighbors, and reliance on an eternally friendly Russia, - all of which the ANM had debunked in the vigorous debates of the late 80's, started gaining prominence again.
The Dashnak party formed the core of nationalist forces in Armenia in the early 1990's. The party traces its roots to the late 19th century, to the days of its struggle against the Ottoman Empire for the rights of Ottoman Armenians. Its ideology is anchored on three concepts: nationalism, socialism and revolutionary struggle. After the Sovietization of Armenia, the party existed only in the Diaspora, and it returned to the homeland shortly after independence. Its main centers, however, and its sources of financing remained based in the Diaspora. The Dashnak party took a very uncompromising stance against practically all the policies of Ter-Petrossian's government from the very first days of its reestablishment in Armenia. They were particularly critical of Ter-Petrossian and his administration for attempts to improve relations with Turkey, for not including the recognition of the Armenian Genocide into Armenia's foreign policy agenda, and for his willingness to compromise with Azerbaijan. The relationship between the Dashnak party and the government degenerated into an open confrontation after the existence of a clandestine terrorist organization affiliated with the party became known. The party was banned in 1994 because of this and other illegal activities, such as accepting funds from abroad, and having ruling bodies outside of Armenia - two things which explicitly violate the law on political parties and public organizations in Armenia.
But Dashnaks and other nationalist groups in opposition in Armenia were not the main problem hindering a compromise solution with Azerbaijan. Instead, the leadership of Karabakh had become the main obstacle to the solution. Even after the Dashnak administration in Karabakh was replaced by one more loyal to Yerevan, the stance of the Karabakh government on the resolution remained unyielding. The leaders of Karabakh argued that the plan of the resolution of the conflict did not provide sufficient guarantees for the security of the Armenian population of Karabakh. Several attempts by Ter-Petrossian to convince Karabakh's leaders to assume a more constructive stance in the negotiations for the resolution of the conflict produced only minor results.
The opposition to Ter-Petrossian's Karabakh policies argued that the abysmal socioeconomic conditions in Armenia are not the result of the Karabakh problem and the blockade, but of bad governance, lack of discipline, tolerance of corruption, as well as of the inability to find a modus vivendi with the opposition and with the Diaspora. Ter-Petrossian took these arguments seriously, and found a somewhat creative solution: he invited the then-President of Karabakh Robert Kocharian to become the Prime Minister of Armenia and personally attempt to achieve improvements in those areas. In doing so, Ter-Petrossian had three main objectives: establishment of a stable government, diffusion of the confrontational atmosphere in the society,[6] and inclusion of the Karabakh leadership into Armenia's governance in order to give them a greater appreciation of the problems there. Instead of diffusing the tensions, however, this strengthened the opposition to Ter-Petrossian's vision of the peaceful settlement inside his own government. Prime Minister Kocharian, the legendary Defense Minister Vazgen Sarkisian and the Minister of Interior and National Security Serzh Sarkisian - all of them war heroes - became the leaders of this internal opposition, supported by a new leadership of Karabakh. This was a much more formidable opposition to deal with, and their claims that Karabakh was being `sold out,' and that `treason' was being committed were much more consequential than anything the official opposition could have said or done. Particularly, their claims that Karabakh would be returned to Azerbaijan without appropriate security guarantees for the Armenian population could lead to its mass exodus from Karabakh.
Ter-Petrossian decided to go public with his views on the settlement, which immediately revealed the basic weakness of his position. The confidentiality of the negotiating process did not allow him to reveal any details about the negotiations, which allowed his opponents to make charges against him which he could not defend himself against without revealing those details. Eventually the confrontation led to the disintegration of the ruling team. Encouraged by Kocharian and the two Sarkisians, a large number of deputies in the Parliament defected from an ANM-led coalition in the Parliament, and the ANM lost the majority. Under those circumstances, Ter-Petrossian chose to resign.
Despite the fact that the letter of the Constitution was followed throughout this period, this amounted to a kind of velvet `coup-d'etat,' as the elected President was forced to resign by members of his own government, who should have resigned themselves if they disagreed with his policies. This was an unprecedented development in Armenia, yet it was not entirely unnatural given the political processes in the country leading to it.
More specifically, it demonstrated again that the victory in the war in 1991-1994 had come at a heavy price for Armenian society. As was said before, the military, and to a certain extent the other security structures as well, had been privileged over other state institutions, because success in the war and preventing anarchy in the country was given priority over other problems. The state also made sure that the veterans of the Karabakh war had some economic security after they returned from the battlefield in order to avoid a situation of having a massive number of unemployed, poor and dissatisfied veterans. These veterans remained well-organized and in control of numerous important economic structures, which determined their power and influence on Armenia's political scene. In 1996 they formed a small group in the Parliament, which grew into a majority after the defection of MPs from the ANM-led coalition in February 1998. Weakened by the political crisis of September 1996 and erosion of his popularity, President Ter-Petrossian was unable to confront the process. As a result, the organization of the war veterans became the most powerful political force in the country. Vazgen Sarkisian became the leader of the main organization of veterans called the `Yerkrapah' union, which replaced the ANM as the ruling political force after the resignation of Ter-Petrossian.
Interestingly enough, the much-maligned liberal economic policy instituted by the previous administration was not abandoned. The logic of the politics of transition in Armenia was seriously affected by the war and the political pendulum had deviated from the rule common for post-Soviet societies. The main challenge came not from the left as in most transitional post-Communist countries, but from the nationalists. They blamed Ter-Petrossian's government for inefficiency, corruption and the inability to develop a cooperative relationship with the opposition and the Diaspora. If these errors were corrected, so went the argument, concessions to Azerbaijan would not be necessary. They also believed that cooperation with the Dashnaks and the Diaspora would increase the influx of aid to Armenia by up to 500 million dollars per year. They argued that curbing corruption, enforcing tax laws and stiffening administrative discipline would dramatically increase the level of foreign investment. Hence, it was supposed that causes of Armenian socioeconomic difficulties and reforms' failure had nothing to do with the unresolved conflict with Azerbaijan and can be overcome through the correction of the reformist course.
Using the preceding views on Armenia as his platform, Robert Kocharian ran for president as the candidate of the victorious governmental party in the pre-term presidential elections following Ter-Petrossian's resignation. Considered one of the main architects of the victory in the Karabakh war, and having an image of being unscathed by the more troublesome aspects of domestic Armenian politics, Kocharian best reflected the nationalistic sentiments of the public awakened by the public debate over Ter-Petrossian's `treacherous' policies. Kocharian's support increased even more after he removed the ban on the activities of the Dashnak party and released its main leaders from detention.[7]
Kocharian also enjoyed the support of the `Yerkrapah' union, which at this point had formed a political wing named the Republican Party, as well as a number of other groups. His victory in the elections, however, proved quite difficult. Karen Demirchian, who was the boss of the Armenian Communist Party for in 1974-1988, had suddenly emerged as an extremely powerful challenger. A large segment of the electorate supported him out of nostalgia for the years when he was the boss of the Armenian Communist Party, a time when living standards were far higher. Many were also drawn to his left-of-center ideology, as well as to his charismatic personality. Kocharian was able to win only in the second round. Once again, elections were marred by reported irregularities. However, they did not have any effects on the political situation because in contrast to 1996, Demirchian did not resort to demonstrations and did not even protest the results of elections in the Constitutional Court. Polls also showed that despite the significant shift of the population to the socialist part of the political spectrum, a nationalist mood prevailed.
What was advocated by Kocharian as his greatest advantage - namely his independence from parties' interests - turned out to be in reality his main weakness. As he was an outsider to any political structure in Armenia, he had to rely on powerful and charismatic political figures, whose loyalty to the President was rather questionable. This further weakened the civic institutions and strengthened the security structures, as Kocharian had no choice but to rely on them. The latter started playing an even more autonomous role within the state. As a result, a de facto triumvirate of President Kocharian, Defense Minister Vazgen Sarkisian, and Interior and National Security Minister Serzh Sarkisian emerged.
Kocharian's strategy for strengthening his own political base was to recruit some of the leaders of the opposition to his administration. The measure significantly reduced the political tensions in the country, but also made the formulation of a coherent state policy and its implementation more difficult. Kocharian also appointed a liberal economist Armen Darbinian as Prime Minister, which signaled that the liberal economic reforms and cooperation with Western financial institutions was to continue. However, Darbinian also had little political support among political parties, and, more crucially, the parliamentary majority seemed to cooperate with him only reluctantly after constant intervention of Kocharian and Vazgen Sarkisian.
Subsequent economic and political developments did not justify the expectations of the new authorities. Although the Russian financial crisis of 1998 did not affect the financial stability of Armenia, it strongly damaged the economy of the country. The socioeconomic situation had drastically worsened. The controversial privatization deals of the state telecommunication company `Armentel' (the telephone call price crisis) and the Armenian brandy factory were harshly criticized by the opposition. The position of the newly-elected president started to weaken. The declared policy of the struggle against the shadow economy only led to a more aggressive tax and custom policy. Despite all the gestures of the new Government toward the Diaspora its financial assistance to Armenia actually decreased.[8] The worsening of the economic situation contrasted sharply to the expectations of the public tied to the fall of Ter-Petrossian's rule.
The ex-ruling party started capitalizing on the fact that Kocharian's rule had not produced any tangible improvements, and criticized him for his unwillingness to settle the Karabakh conflict through a mutual compromise with Azerbaijan. Kocharian perceived this as a major threat to his policies and political positions, and launched a relentless campaign against ANM through the National TV and mass media outlets loyal to him. In late 1998 the Chairman of ANM Vano Siradeghian was indicted on charges of organizing a clandestine unit within the Ministry of the Interior, which was presumably responsible for a series of assassinations. Also indicted and arrested for embezzlement was the ex-Minister of Education Ashot Bleyan, one of the harshest critics of the nationalists, who advocated the most radical concessions to Azerbaijan and argued that the Armenian Genocide should not be taught in elementary schools. All these accusations were dismissed by ANM and affiliated forces as a form of political revenge and oppression.
The political atmosphere in the country was further poisoned by a number of assassinations of prominent officials, including the Prosecutor General and high ranking officials from the Ministry of Defense, in mysterious circumstances. It was particularly shocking, because no assassination of any prominent figure had taken place since December 1994.[9]
The most serious tensions, however, originated from disagreements within the triumvirate itself, which generated speculations among some pundits that the new chain of assassinations could be linked to those disagreements. One consequence of these differences was clear. The executive power was further weakened, which contributed to the increasing political autonomy and influence of security structures. The growing split within the ruling team had consequences not only in Armenia, but in Karabakh as well, where the influential commander of the Army of Self-defense of Karabakh General Samvel Babayan challenged the policies of the President of Karabakh Arkady Ghukasian, who enjoyed the support of authorities in Yerevan. The killings of officials from Vazgen Sarkisian's closest circles and the failure to identify killers by law enforcement agencies contributed further to the growth of tensions. The unprecedented statement by the Ministry of Defense criticized the Ministry of Interior and Prosecutor's office and urged them to do their work properly.
It was against this background that the new electoral campaign for the parliament of Armenia - National Assembly - began. This time the disappointment with the liberal economic policies of the Government could not be distracted anymore by nationalist rhetoric. The popularity of the left-center political current, created by Demirchian after his imminent bid for the Presidency, reached its apogee and made it an apparent frontrunner in the parliamentary campaign. Polls showed an apparent shift of public opinion to the left, socialist pole in the country. `Socialism' suddenly stopped being a pejorative term, as many started openly remembering the prosperous `Demirchian era' with nostalgia. In this situation Vazgen Sarkisian, whose political positions were weakened by the rising tensions with the two other members of the `triumvirate', as well as by public discontent with the `Yerkrapah rule,' made a move that radically changed the situation. After difficult consultations he surprisingly made an electoral alliance with Kocharian's main rival - Karen Demirchian. The alliance, which was called `Miasnutyun' (Unity) was a winning move because it combined Demirchian's popularity with control that Vazgen Sarkissian had over many levers of power.
Since the popularity of this alliance was undisputed, President Kocharian abstained from criticism of the new block. He applied a strategy of supporting `Miasnutyun' in public along with other political forces, which according to his calculations would give him decisive authority in cases where there were no obvious winners and presidential power would be the crucial factor in forming governmental coalitions. Despite the open and frequently harsh criticism by `Miasnutyun' campaigners, Kocharian made a public statement in which he expressed his personal support for two political currents: `Miasnutyun' and Dashnaks.
The electoral campaign, that started in March 1999, clearly showed that a qualitatively new situation had been created in the country, where political influence and the competition of political forces affiliated with the security structures had become decisive for the outcome of elections. New political parties emerged which were affiliated to the powerful leaders of the security structures. For instance, the `Orinats yerkir' party was created that was supported by another `triumvir' - Minister of Interior Serzh Sarkisian. The other new phenomenon in Armenian politics was the involvement of the Karabakh security strongman - Commander of Nagorno-Karabakh Army Samvel Babayan, who sponsored the union of several tiny parties called `Iravunq yev Miasnutyun' (Right and Accord) - despite the opposition of the Yerevan authorities. Both parties did not have any clear ideological platform and were obviously patronage networks.
The actual elections demonstrated that purely ideological parties were unable to perform well. Instead, these were elections where personal charisma and political expediency won out. Political parties with clear ideological platforms - Communists, national-socialist Dashnaks and nationalist liberal NDU - received only 23 seats in the 131-strong Parliament. The parties affiliated with security structures, on the other hand, were quite successful. Among them Vazgen Sarkissian and his party were the undisputed winners: in addition to their own deputies then enjoyed the support of 20 MP's formally unaffiliated with any party in the Parliament.
MP Affiliations | Majoritarian | Proportional | Total | Percent |
Republican Party (Vazgen Sargusyan) | 55 | 20 | 75 | 59 |
People’s Party (Karen Demirchyan) | 7 | 9 | 16 | 13 |
Total as “Miasnutyun” | 62 | 29 | 91 | 62 |
Communist Party | 1 | 8 | 9 | 7 |
Rights & Accord (Samvel Babayan) | 1 | 7 | 8 | 6 |
Dashnaks | 3 | 5 | 8 | 6 |
Country of Law (Serzh Sargissian) | 2 | 4 | 6 | 5 |
NDU | 2 | 4 | 6 | 5 |
ANM | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
Total | 71 | 57 | 128 | 100 |
Elections also demonstrated that the `party of peace,' as ANM was called by Ter-Petrossian in his speech of resignation, was still in crisis. Demoralized by the loss of power and accusations of corruption and economic mismanagement during its rule, as well as paralyzed by internal splits, it was not able to adopt a coherent strategy of participation in the elections. The majority of ANM, as well as some affiliated parties, decided to boycott the elections in protest against the influence of security structures on the electoral process. However, a small group of ANM members led by its Chairman Vano Siradeghian did participate in the elections. As a result of such division, the party was not able even to achieve the 5% of the vote needed and only Siradeghian was able to win a seat in a majoritarian district.
Once again there were allegations of irregularities, but both the domestic and international observers considered the elections to be generally free and fair and reflective of the people's will. Despite these positive characteristics, the elections also showed that voters were becoming increasingly interested in the immediate material gains that different candidates could promise, rather than the substance of their political programs. These new features in the voters' behavior were largely exploited by various candidates and numerous cases of `voter bribing' and manipulating by local strongmen were reported. However, the overall victory of the `Miasnutyun' block was acknowledged by the main acting political forces in the country, which stood in marked contrast to the marred legitimacy of some prior elections.
The outcome of the elections meant first of all that the already powerful Vazgen Sargissian became the most influential politician in the country, since the overwhelming majority of the newly elected MP's were not directly loyal to Kocharian, but to him. This situation was formalized when on June 11 Sarkisian was appointed Prime Minister. The full control that the new Prime Minister had over the Parliament, chaired now by his closest ally Karen Demirchian, meant that the situation in the country resembled the French Cohabitation. That Kocharian had lost the most essential element of his real power base became clear after the Ministry of the Interior and National Security headed by his ally in the `triumvirate' Serzh Sargissian was split into two ministries despite the President's opposition. Two of Vazgen Sargissian's close affiliates became the ministers of Defense and Interior, with Serzh Sargissian retaining only the post of the Minister of National Security. For the first time since independence the President's power was dramatically constrained and real authority was transferred to the Prime Minister, who relied on the Parliamentary majority. The most important security structures - the army and the Ministry of Interior - were now under his control.
Kocharian, meanwhile, decided to distance himself from the Government and concentrate on foreign policy where his close ally Vardan Oskanian remained as one of the few pro-Kocharian Ministers. The Ministry of Justice and the Prosecutor General's office, also remained under Kocharian's control, which was a part of a tacit power-sharing agreement.
The established political equilibrium strengthened the positions of the war veterans even more. They retained the most lucrative economic positions both in private and public sectors, comprised the most powerful group in the Parliament, and controlled the most important positions in the army and the police. This formed the robust and loyal power base of charismatic Vazgen Sargissian. The enormous political support behind Sarkisian led even the entire opposition in the Parliament to declare that they trusted him with leadership of the country.
Some of his subsequent actions during his short tenure as Prime Minister only stressed his role as the leader of the nation, which he started increasingly to assume upon himself. Sarkisian began to hold monthly televised addresses to the nation, which was unprecedented in the country. The top role of the Prime Minister was underlined during the Armenia-Diaspora conference organized to improve the cooperation with influential Armenian communities abroad. Sarkisian also became a leading player in local elections. His actions and statements ensured the proper conduct of elections, recognized by western observers as free and fair, and his loyalists overwhelmingly won elections. Sarkisian was able to improve discipline and organize effectively the daily work in the Government. He also disclosed his plan to fight corruption, which was welcomed by all political forces. Over time, Sarkisian started to deal increasingly with foreign policy issues as well.
Despite all the efforts Ter-Petrossian's successors made, the socioeconomic conditions in Armenia did not show any signs of improvement. During my conversations with members of both Kocharian and Sarkisian's inner circles, I was told that they eventually recognized the impossibility of effective development without a compromise settlement with Azerbaijan. Their thinking seemed to have gradually evolved into the same set of solutions, which the previous administration had endorsed. The above-mentioned package deal, which was accepted by Ter-Petrossian and rejected by Karabakh and Azerbaijan in 1997 and criticized at that time by both Kocharian and Sargissian, was once again revived and put on the table of negotiations. The essential elements of the future status of Karabakh within Azerbaijan did not undergo any significant changes in the plan, and only the "de jure" part of the formula had changed terms in which the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan was formulated. More vague, and presumably more acceptable for all conflicting parties, the formula now referred to the `common state within internationally recognized borders' of Azerbaijan. The change was welcomed by Karabakh authorities and was presented by Kocharian's administration to public opinion as a major diplomatic victory, which secures `horizontal, rather than vertical link' between Azerbaijan and Karabakh. However, it was dismissed by representatives of Ter-Petrossian's camp on the grounds, that 1) the plan still did not work because of its continued rejection by Azerbaijan, 2) Kocharian's administration only `imitated' negotiations, but in fact was not interested in a real settlement and 3) it did not add anything essential to the "de facto" part of the status of Karabakh comparatively with what was negotiated by the previous administration.
Notwithstanding, in the end of the summer of 1999 signals were increasingly sent from Kocharian's administration claiming seriousness of its intentions for achieving a breakthrough in the conflict settlement. The intensive contacts between the presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan, as well as the intensified visits of the co-chairmen of the Minsk group combined with optimistic statements of conflicting parties and increasing anxiety of corresponding oppositions in Armenia, Karabakh and Azerbaijan fueled expectations of the possible breakthrough. On October 27th Strobe Talbott visited Armenia and held a joint meeting with Kocharian and Sarkisian. The visit underlined the seriousness of continuing negotiations and the confidence of the United States in the productivity of negotiations.
This was the state of affairs when Vazgen Sargissian, Karen Demirchian, and 5 other high ranking officials were assassinated in the Parliament building on October 27th, 1999. In a matter of seconds the leadership of the ruling coalition `Miasnutyun' was obliterated. Whatever the motives of the perpetrators, it was obvious that their aim was to decapitate the ruling majority. Speculation as to who might have stood behind the terrorists started immediately. There were three broad groups of theories. According to one, this was an act of deranged psychotics, and there was no need to look further. The second group of such theories pointed to the possible involvement of foreign countries with Russia, the US, Turkey, and Iran as possible candidates. The third group of theories focused on possible domestic interests to eliminate the ruling coalition's leadership. Obviously, none of these speculations can be seriously discussed until the investigation has found evidence to support them.
The assassinations were a severe blow to the young and fragile political institutions of the country. The country was thrown into a situation where its most powerful statesmen and high-ranking officials were killed or taken hostage. The chain of command was broken in the most vital institutions of the state, and an enormous power vacuum had emerged. The situation was aggravated by the distrust between the President and the important branches of the Government, consisting of Vazgen Sarkisian's loyalists, which was inherited from the previous period of Cohabitation, and now could not be managed by Vazgen Sargissian anymore.
Immediately after the assassinations this group headed by influential minister Vahan Shirkhanian who was one of the closest allies of Vazgen Sarkisian, demanded the appointment of Shirkhanian as Prime Minister, as well as the dismissal of the Prosecutor General and the Minister of National Security, who were blamed for failing to prevent the assassinations. These demands were considered an unacceptable ultimatum to the President, and were rejected. A serious political crisis developed as a result.
In the process of long and difficult negotiations between the two camps, which at times became dangerously confrontational,[10] two important compromises were finally reached. On November 3rd the brother of slain Vazgen Sargissian - Aram - was appointed Prime Minister. He suited the governmental camp as a figure who could preserve the balance between different factions of the ruling team (ministers representing the Republican party, the military elite, and the `Yerkrapah' union). He was also acceptable to Kocharian, because he was politically inexperienced and presumably easy to deal with. Other important compromises were reached with regard to the composition of the new cabinet. The President withdrew his opposition to the continued presence of the Minister of Industrial Infrastructure Vahan Shirkhanian and Defense Minister Vagharshak Haroutunian in the government, and accepted the candidacy of a new Prosecutor General, who was a close affiliate of Aram Sargissian. Most importantly, he agreed to dismiss his main ally - Serzh Sargissian - and appoint a new Minister of National Security. In exchange, Aram Sargissian and his team agreed to appoint politically neutral people as ministers of National Security and Interior. The ministers of Foreign Affairs and Justice from the previous government, who were Kocharian loyalists, were also retained in their positions. Thus, the crisis of the power vacuum was resolved in short-term perspective and the functioning of power branches restored.
Despite the seeming normalcy restored in the country's political life after the election of a new leadership in the National Assembly and the appointment of the new Government, the current political situation in Armenia is far from being stable. The two most important reasons for potential instability are 1) the de facto bipolar division of the executive power, formed after the crisis; and 2) the absence of recognized and authoritative leaders in the ruling majority.
There are now, roughly speaking, two main poles of power - the presidential palace, and the governmental camp, which relies on the parliamentary majority. Both have sets of different levers and means of exercising executive power through both their constitutional authority and influence in security structures and other ministries. The present state of political power in the country can be viewed as a "diarchy", because these two poles not only are not collaborative, but are also in fact in a state of confrontation with one another.
The main sources of power the presidential camp has are: 1) the constitutional authority to dissolve the Parliament in June 2000 (the Parliament cannot be dissolved within one year after its elections); 2) the constitutional authority of the President to appoint the highest officials in the military; 3) the constitutional authority of the President to sign the decisions of the Government (which can be used negatively, that is, to block inconvenient decisions); 4) the influence of the President in the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of National Security (mostly through his Chief of Staff Serzh Sarkisian, who has been heading both ministries during several years) and the regulatory authority of the President to appoint and dismiss deputy ministers in security ministries; 5) the control over the most important outlets of mass media, especially, over the National TV (through a pro-Kocharian board of directors); 6) the informal influence on the judiciary, through the pro-Kocharian Minister of Justice.
The main sources of power of the governmental camp in the current political situation are: 1) the constitutional authority of the Parliament to initiate impeachment proceedings against the President, who cannot dissolve the Parliament since the moment of the initiation of impeachment proceedings, and the constitutional authority to impeach the President after the approval of the Constitutional Court; 2) the constitutional authority to make decisions on behalf of the executive branch; 3) the constitutional authority of the parliamentary majority to reject any Prime Minister appointed by the President; 4) the control over majority of ministries, especially over key ones - the Ministry of Defense, Ministry of State Revenues, and the considerable influence in the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of National Security; 5) the informal control over the office of the Prosecutors General. These levers and sources of power define the dynamics of politics in the current state of political diarchy in Armenia. It is obvious for both conflicting parties, as well as for the whole Armenian society that the continuation of the diarchy can only weaken the state and make the hopes of economic recovery very slim.
In their efforts to overcome the diarchy and to restore cohesiveness of the executive, however, the two camps pursue confronting tactics. The goal of the President is to win time in order to consolidate his power, to regain the authority to dissolve the Parliament and to manipulate the contradictions between the factions inside the governmental camp. He has also distanced himself from the economic policies of the Government, putting the entire responsibility for worsening socioeconomic conditions on the Government. In the meantime, the loyal outlets of mass media are busy preparing public opinion for the possible sacking of the Prime Minister, and even the dissolution of the Parliament. He is also busy strengthening his positions in the security structures by dismissing those deputy ministers that he does not trust.
In contrast, the governmental camp is trying to prevent the dissolution of the Parliament and limit the President's ability to intervene into its affairs. There were active discussions in January and February in the "Miasnutyun" regarding the adoption of constitutional amendments that will limit the President's authority to dissolve the Parliament, to sack the Prime Minister, to appoint ministers, and to sign governmental decisions. It was presumed that the amendments would be adopted through a referendum before June and would effectively strip the President of his trump card - the right to dissolve the Parliament. However, the complicated procedures of the adoption of constitutional amendments, which can be blocked by the President, made the idea a very unattractive one. The control over key security and economic structures before the possible intervention by the President in June gave the governmental camp a short-term advantage and the possibility for brokering deals with influential political forces in the country and political pressures on the President. This is used by the governmental camp to create pressures leading to resignations or the weakening of allies of the President
Overall, however, it is clear that time is working in favor of the presidential camp. There is a factor that can reverse this tendency, namely the results of the investigation into the assassination, if they were to reveal any complicity of the President or his political allies in the killings. The arrests of the presidential adviser Aleksan Haroutyunian - the close confidant of the President and his Chief of Staff at the time of terrorist attack - and the deputy-chief of National TV Haroutyun Haroutyunian - a member of pro-Kocharian Dashnak party - on charges of assisting the terrorists were a serious blow to Kocharian's political position. In response, the pro-Kocharian National TV and other loyal mass media outlets launched a campaign to discredit Military Prosecutor Gagik Jahangirian, who is conducting the investigation. They blamed investigators for the illegal collection of evidence and manipulating the investigation for the sake of the political goals of "Miasnutyun". However, the strong reaction from "Miasnutyun", the Communists, as well as the joint statement of political groupings affiliated with the ex-ruling party, were able to end the campaign for the time being.
This time-out was used by Aram Sarkisian for political regrouping and strengthening his positions. In particular, he initiated the formation of a new coalition government on 28 February, where three ministerial portfolios were given to two opposition parties - Communists and NDU. After the pro-Kocharian National TV once again launched a harsh criticism of the investigation, "Miasnutyun" accused Kocharian's Chief of Staff Serzh Sarkisian and the Chief of National TV Tigran Naghdalian of obstruction of justice and demanded their immediate resignations. Kocharian rejected the demands and issued a decree that took back the mandate to appoint high military officials, which was previously given by President Ter-Petrossian to the Minister of Defense. "Miasnutyun" in response threatened to withdraw its political support for the President, alluding to the possibility of initiating impeachment proceedings. The threat looked credible in light of statements made by the Military Prosecutor, that the head of terrorists could have been recruited by the Ministry of National Security, hinting at the possible complicity of then Minister Serzh Sarkisian. The confrontation seemed to heat up, when in a surprising move Kocharian promoted leaders of the "Yerkrapah" union to high positions in the Ministry of Defense and the Army. Kocharian's harshest foe - the chairman of the union Manvel Grigorian - was appointed deputy Minister of Defense. The same day the pro-Kocharian chief of Armenian TV tendered his resignation. Kocharian's surprising actions contained both elements of compromise and an attempt to neutralize his harshest foes and to create discord in the rival camp.
It is difficult now to predict the final outcome of this political chess game, especially because it is now in full swing. It is reasonable to suggest that the solution of the crisis of diarchy can be expected in the period close to June when the President acquires the right to dissolve the Parliament. Then he will be able to appoint a more loyal Prime Minister by threatening to dissolve the National Assembly if it does not approve his choice. To prevent such a development the parliamentary majority may initiate impeachment proceedings. All these moves, however, depend on more important behind-the-doors developments related to the control of the confronting camps over key security structures. Taking into account the huge political influence security structures and war veteran commanders exert, it is reasonable to suggest that their support will be key to determining the winner.
The democratic transition in Armenia has had its achievements and setbacks. The main achievement is the creation of working political institutions of governance, such as the Constitution and other regulatory legislation that formed the basic framework of mechanisms of a democratic state system in Armenia. The short history of the Constitution in the new Armenia showed that despite all inefficiencies of its political system, and antagonisms between different political forces, they were able to resolve all these frequently confrontational relations in accordance with the Constitutional mechanisms. Three severe political crises described in this paper - in September 1996, February 1998 and October-November 1999 - were overcome with the help of political mechanisms set by the Constitution. Political forces in the country increasingly demonstrate their respect towards the spirit and letter of the Constitution and the longer it persists the stronger it becomes as a working and respected political institution. Another important acquisition of the Armenian democracy is deepening entrenchment of basic democratic values such as freedom of speech, press and political pluralism. The growth of civic society, NGOs and mass media, as well as deepening of political freedoms make it impossible for any political force in Armenia to establish an autocratic regime of any kind. Politicians of all levels care increasingly about their standing in the public opinion, especially on the eve of elections. It can be stated that democracy has already developed strong foundations in Armenia.
Many severe problems persist, nonetheless. The absence of long-term democratic traditions, as well as the deficiencies in the electoral mechanisms has made the struggle for power dirty at times. There were many reports about irregularities during elections, such as bribing voters, meddling of different executive structures and vote rigging. Another unfortunate feature of Armenian politics is the extreme unwillingness of political forces to recognize publicly their defeat in elections, which can be only partly explained by doubts about the integrity of the electoral process, and rather should be derived from the interaction of different cultural, psychological and political factors. For instance, even the apparent landslide victory of Ter-Petrossian in 1991 and of `Miasnutyun' in 1999 was questioned by defeated teams. In the event of thin margins between contenders, the refusal to recognize the outcome of elections led in several cases to widespread doubts about the legitimacy of elected power and in one case even to the violent storming of the Parliament by supporters of the defeated candidate (25 September 1996). This has created an atmosphere of distrust in society and discredited state institutions, considered by many as lacking legitimacy. That also negatively affected the people's belief in the possibility for political change through democratic electoral mechanisms. The assassinations of Karen Demirchian and Vazgen Sarkisian, who had the overwhelming support of the electorate, contributed to further popular disappointment with the democratic participation and functioning of Armenian democracy.
Today, however, the most basic problem of Armenian politics to be solved in the short-run is the restoration of cohesive executive power in the country. Only after the state of diarchy is overcome and Armenia once again has a functioning government, can one think about progress in economic reforms, and the resolution of the most vital problem of Armenia in the long run - the Karabakh conflict. The solution of the latter problem is now viewed by almost all major political parties of Armenia as a prerequisite for economic development, improvements in the socioeconomic conditions and strengthening of democracy in the country. This consensus can be considered as major progress compared with a situation more than two years ago, when only Ter-Petrossian's administration held that stance. In another encouraging development, the Karabakh leadership has officially accepted the Minsk group's plan of settlement of the conflict as a basis for negotiations. That gives Kocharian a major advantage in his ability to persuade the public, a trump card Ter-Petrossian never had.
However, that does not mean that the solution of the problem is now guaranteed. First of all, Kocharian's willingness to resolve the Karabakh conflict is quite questionable. Second of all, even if he is really determined to resolve the conflict he will encounter enormous problems. The settlement of the conflict requires serious mutual concessions by Karabakh, Armenia and Azerbaijan. Any politician in power in Armenia or Karabakh, who plans to implement those concessions will meet strong opposition, especially from the victorious and politically powerful military elite. In Karabakh, for instance, President Arkady Ghukasian met strong opposition to his acceptance of the Minsk group proposals from the commander-in-chief of the Karabakh Army Samvel Babayan, who accused him of selling out the interests of Karabakh. Ghukasian was able to overcome Babayan's resistance and sack the ambitious general with the unanimous support of the military elite in Yerevan, which was irritated by Babayan's constant meddling into Armenia's domestic politics. This model could not be applied in Armenia itself, where the military elite enjoys much more autonomous political power through the Republican party's majority in the Parliament and the war veteran's organization "Yerkrapah".
The political role played by these political organizations affiliated with the military elite is somewhat controversial. On the one hand, these are highly statesmanlike people, who have proved their patriotic credentials on the frontline. They played an important role during several political crises, by contributing to their orderly resolutions: preserving constitutional order in September 1996, securing continuity of governance in 1998, preventing efforts at oppression of the ANM after it lost power, forming an alliance with Demirchian in 1999, which eased tensions in the country, immediate actions of the Army after the assassinations that prevented chaos in the country on October 27th, 1999. After the fall of ANM rule they also were able to prevent a fragmentation of the political elite, both through the creation of large political alliances and the adoption of electoral laws based mostly on the plurality principle.[11] On the other hand, the same belligerent patriotism makes them unyielding in the settlement of Karabakh issue that implies concessions of land, which was so abundantly conquered by the blood of their comrades in arms. This is why they rejected the Karabakh policy of Ter-Petrossian. Today they have the same unyielding stance and are the most formidable domestic obstacle for the resolution of the Karabakh problem.
This controversial role of the military elite and its disproportionately large influence in the political life of the country is a natural consequence of enormous geopolitical threats to the national security of the country and it will continue as long as these threats exist. Only the readiness of the military elite to accept the political plan of the settlement of the Karabakh problem will make its implementation possible for the Armenian side of the conflict. Yet today's negative stance of the ruling majority toward concessions in the Karabakh issue only contributes to the bulk of other causes blocking the resolution of the conflict.[12] However, the opposition to the speedy resolution of the Karabakh conflict through mutual compromise itself exacerbates those threats creating a vicious circle. There are two possible ways of squaring this vicious circle.
The President can try to use his constitutional prerogatives for breaking the organized political influence of the Army through both personnel changes in the military and separate political deals with influential generals, which will sow discord in the ranks of the already not so cohesive team of majority. However, even if this policy works, which seems problematic so far, the President risks not only breaking the political will of the military, but also bringing discord into the vital organizational structures of the Army and its command and consequently weakening its combat efficiency. Such a sin would not be forgiven for any politician in Armenia.
Another possibility is the emergence of a leader or a team 1) able to gain respect and trust of the military elite, 2) strong and authoritative enough to impose difficult political decisions on the military, 3) having the full support of citizenry. The alliance of Vazgen Sarkisian - Karen Demirchian was exactly such a team, which could deliver the peace deal both to the society and the Army. Unfortunately, President Kocharian currently has a very low public opinion rating[13] and does not command sufficient respect in the Army. The distrust of the military elite towards Kocharian significantly diminishes possibilities for him to handle the situation with diarchy in the country and the resolution of the Karabakh conflict. His main strength at this moment stems from the fact that there is no clear alternative to him.[14]
After the assassinations of the leaders of `Miasnutyun', the block lacks powerful and charismatic leaders able to challenge Kocharian as a feasible alternative for the presidency. Stepan Demirchian, the son of slain Karen Demirchian, who now chairs the People's party founded by his father and strikes the public by resemblance to him, enjoys some popularity among his father's electorate. However, he and another newly arisen leader of `Miasnutyun', Aram Sarkisian are both novices in politics and have to undergo a long period of political activity before any judgements about their skills and perspectives can be made. There are some discussions in inner circles of `Miasnutyun' about possible candidacies for the presidency, although no clear preferences exist at this moment. Political analysts speculate in this regard that whoever emerges as a presidential candidate from `Miasnutyun' at this time, will in all likelihood be a transitional puppet-like figure needed just for the purpose of ousting Kocharian in order to restore the cohesiveness of the executive power.
Vazgen Manukian, the leader of NDU, is one of the Armenian politicians who can count on a significant percentage of the vote if pre-term presidential elections were to be held, especially in the absence of such popular leaders as were slain Demirchian and Sarkisian. Some of the popularity of his party is based on its relentless opposition to all the governments of Armenia since independence. However, his previous defeats in presidential races and recent collaboration of his party with the Government can alienate a part of his traditional electorate. As for his relations with the military, the Army trusts him even less than it trusts Kocharian. This means that the military will do everything within the limits of its political influence to prevent his rise to power, foreseeing a bitter confrontation with him in the case of his hypothetical election.
The traditional parties - Communists and national-socialist Dashnaks - with their small electorates and absence of powerful and recognized leaders will only be able to throw their support behind a candidate of one of the major forces of the big political game. The Communists will tacitly support the governmental camp because they have been given two ministerial portfolios in the current cabinet. The Dashnaks, who have traditionally had extremely strained relations with `Yerkrapah', will fiercely support Kocharian despite their public disapproval of any concessions in Karabakh.
The political influence of the `Right and Accord', which could at some moment be seen as a major opposition force to `Miasnutyun' will gradually evaporate with the fading political positions of general Babayan in Karabakh.
The last but not least significant force on the political scene of the country is an assemblage of groupings affiliated with the ex-ruling party, whose present state can be characterized as very poor. Its most prominent leader and the ex-President of the country Levon Ter-Petrossian is now in a self-imposed political isolation. The rank and file of the party is demoralized because of recent accusations of corruption and ongoing indictments of some of its leaders. Also serious differences amongst its various groupings led to the formation of rival factions and even small autonomous parties.[15] Nevertheless, despite the above-mentioned problems, all these factions and parties have a common liberal- democratic ideology and a conciliatory stance in the Karabakh issue and recognize Ter-Petrossian as a leader able to unify all liberal political forces of the country into a robust single force. Ter-Petrossian is also highly respected by the military elite. However, his overall popularity is not sufficiently high because he is blamed by many layers of society for the sharp decline of the economy and living standards compared to the Soviet period, which caused large waves of emigration in 1992-1994. That does not mean that the political resurrection of Ter-Petrossian is impossible. His standing in the public opinion has improved slightly and is likely to grow over time as the main economic indicators in the last years of his presidency are compared to those after his resignation[16] and political stability during his rule is remembered. However, despite many efforts of different liberal political forces for unification it is obvious that the process will take some time before the reverse movement of the political pendulum has gathered full force.
Despite significant achievements, the democratic transition and market reforms in Armenia are increasingly impeded by the complicated geopolitical situation around the country. The war in 1991-1994, the unresolved Karabakh problem, the economic blockade of Armenia by Turkey and Azerbaijan not only have negatively affected the economy, but also have had a profound influence on the politics of transition in the country. Particularly, the ongoing threats to the national security of the state have disproportionately increased the political influence of the military elite and other security structures. As a result President Ter-Petrossian's policies aimed at resolution of the Karabakh conflict were rejected by his own government. The new nationalist government, however, failed to realize its program of economic development without resolution of the conflict and was eventually evolving toward the policies of the previous administration. The recent murder of several Armenian leaders has aggravated the internal political situation by creating a diarchy in the country.
As a result Armenia needs a long and painful period of consolidation of executive power and the regaining of effective leadership which is trusted both by the public and the military elite and able to face the problems of - the most crucial one being the resolution of the Karabakh conflict. The settlement of the Karabakh problem, with respect to the aspects of domestic Armenian politics, considered in this paper, will meet with enormous difficulties domestically. However, Armenia cannot afford the preservation of the status quo in the Karabakh issue for a long period without serious threats to its independence, national security and economic well-being. Either the political forces currently in power will be able to transform themselves into an effective and cohesive party of peace or another such party will come to power after new political upheavals.
Levon Zourabian was an advisor to the Republic of Armenia's President Levon Ter-Petrossian in 1991-1998 and acted as his press-secretary in 1994-1998. He is currently a Muskie fellow at Columbia University where this study was presented. |
© Copyright 2000 Armenian News Network/Groong and the author.
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