Armenian
News Network / Groong
Hello,
and welcome to the Armenian News Network, Groong,
Week in Review. This show was recorded on Monday, August 22, 2022.
Here are the major topics we’ll touch on today:
● Surmalu Blast
● Developments in Foreign Affairs
○ Aliyev Rejects Status for Artsakh
○ Aghavno Handover
○ DM Papikyan in Moscow
○ Iran Reiterates Redline on Syunik
● Update on Opposition Movement
To talk about
these issues, we have with us:
Benyamin Poghosyan, who is the Chairman of the Yerevan based think
tank Center for Political and Economic
Strategic Studies,
Last
Sunday, August 14, shortly before 1:30pm an explosion ripped through a market, Surmalu, in central Yerevan. The blast killed 16, and
injured over 60 people, and the premises were destroyed. As international
condolences streamed in from around the world, hundreds of emergency responders
worked around the clock for days to rescue people from the rubbles.
The
explosion happened in an environment of repeated bomb threats over the past
weeks and months that increased in frequency to be almost a daily occurrence, hemorrhaging
public transportation and citizens services as authorities investigated each
bomb threat. Yet, despite an ongoing
investigation by law enforcement and continuing bomb threats, Nikol Pashinyan ruled out terrorism and ascribed the cause
of the explosion to a fireworks depot where 4 tons of explosives were
reportedly stored.
● What are some of the developments around the
scene of the disaster since last weekend?
● What more do we know about the explosion?
● Pashinyan ruled out terrorism pretty early on,
at a time when most people didn’t have much information to go on and the
investigation is still ongoing. Thoughts?
We
mentioned the fake bomb threats that caused tension and alarm around the
country after the blast. Sadly, these are still continuing. At the same time,
some Western-funded media gave airtime to pundits who carelessly floated rumors
that the Russians had something to do with spreading this panic and terror. So
on the 17th of August, the Russian Embassy sent a note of protest to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, about the Armenian authorities
tolerating such an atmosphere of fake news, and degrading the trust and
relationship between Armenia and Russia, who are supposedly “strategic allies”.
● Does the Armenian government have a
responsibility to control what type of allegations are heard in the media?
○ If you remember in early 2020, when one Facebook
user posted fake news about Iran the NSS, the Armenian National Security
Service, demonstratively arrested this person with the fake name of Diana
Harutyunyan (whose real identity and circumstances of the criminal case are
still unknown) under the guise that these fake news
were aimed at disrupting Armenia’s relations with Iran.
● How should we assess
this unusual expression of outrage by Russia?
● What does it say about the state of our foreign
relations with Russia?
Within
the domestic political scene, Tigran Avinyan showed
up on site, effectively announcing his candidacy
for the Yerevan mayoral race in 2023. As we know, he’s a close associate of Pashinyan’s in the Civil Contract party.
● Was that surreal, or simply insensitive?
● Is Civil Contract throwing the current mayor, Hrachya Sargsyan, under the bus?
● How do you assess the presence and involvement
of the current mayor and city council of Yerevan?
● In the aftermath of the tragedy, the Civil
Contract government has resurrected legislative plans to ban the sale of
fireworks to private citizens, once the new national assembly is in session.
Was the possibility of selling fireworks a major factor here?
Ten
days ago, Aliyev held a live press conference during which he announced that he
would grant no status
of any sort to Nagorno Karabakh. He said Karabakh-Armenians would have the same
right and all other aspects as any other Azerbaijani citizen.
I
don’t know if we need to beat a dead horse any deader, the message from Aliyev
has been clear since the 44-day war, that he wants no Armenians in Azerbaijan.
Benyamin,
you’ve also been very clear about Azerbaijan’s strategy of forcing an attrition
on the population of Armenians in Artsakh, by terrorizing and repopulating parts
of Artsakh by Azeris, as he works to force more concessions on Pashinyan. The
imminent situation of course is the handover of Aghavno,
and Berdzor, in the Lachin corridor.
It seems the
handover of Aghavno is final. Inner Sus, Aghavno and Berdzor will be
depopulated of Armenians in a matter of days.
Aliyev announced
that those left after Aug 25 will be treated as terrorists or enemy combatants.
So much for Armenians having the same rights as Azeri citizens.
● Hovik you were in Aghavno,
what did you see?
In the past we’ve
covered and tried to ask questions about this whole Berdzor/Lachin
corridor handover, including:
● Was the handover of these three villages even
stemming from the November 9/10 statement or not?
● Why accelerate the handover to August 2022,
especially since the trilateral statement specifies a deadline of November 2023
for the approval of plans to reroute parts of the corridor?
● Why was the Armenian side claiming there is no
agreement when there’s at least some evidence to the contrary?
The Artsakh
authorities seem to be taking the fall for this by publicly saying that they
approved the new route based on the suggestion of Russian peacekeepers, while
also saying that this is stemming from a demand by Azerbaijan.
Then, on August
17, Maksim Seleznev, counselor to the Russian ambassador in Armenia, issued an
eye-opening statement on Lachin, specifically implying that if the
Russian Peacekeeping forces are re-stationed, then the new route will be
considered the “new Lachin corridor”.
● What are the ramifications of Seleznev’s
statement?
● If the temporary road is considered a corridor,
then it passes through Aghavno, why depopulate (or
some would claim ethnically cleanse) it now?
● Has anyone followed up with the Russian foreign
ministry?
While
the diplomatic row between Armenia and Russia was festering, DM Papikyan was in Moscow meeting
with Russian DM Shoygu. Reportedly he was there for a
few functions:
● Discussing the Russian peacekeeping mission in
Nagorno-Karabakh
● Attending a Conference on International Security
● Attending the Army 2022 Military Expo.
● What was achieved?
Ten days ago
Iranian president Ibrahim Raisi reiterated
an earlier statement by the Ayatollah Khamenei that Iran is “sensitive” about
its border with Syunik, and that Iran would “oppose any attempt to alter them”,
referring clearly to Turkish and Azerbaijani threats to carve through Armenia
to connect Azerbaijan with Nakhichevan.
At the same time
as the above, an Armenian MP in Iran’s parliament, Robert Beglarian,
announced that Iran had appointed a consul general to Syunik, who would reside
in Kapan.
● What is your read on Iran’s multiple statements
on “opposing” or “not tolerating” encroachments on Armenia’s southern region of
Syunik? Are they willing to commit their military to defend against any changes
in borders?
● Aside from the symbolic and potentially military
commitment to Syunik, do you think this appointment can help in ramping up
economic trade between Iran and Syunik?
● What is Armenia’s reaction to all this?
Last week, the
Armenian National Security Service proposed setting up 3 checkpoints on the
border of Armenia and Azerbaijan. This was in response to a public address from
Pashinyan during a government session two weeks ago where he requested the
security service to submit such a proposal to give Azerbaijanis “unhindered”
access to Armenia. On the western border, the proposed checkpoint will be Yeraskh, while on the Eastern border the checkpoints are
proposed to be in Sotk (Gegharkunik) and Karahunj
(Syunik), the location of the Goris-Kapan highway that Pashinyan handed over to
Aliyev (apparently based on verbal agreements).
● What is your assessment of this proposal
Benyamin?
● The proposal also says a lot by what it doesn’t
say. Azerbaijan has repeatedly said it wants a corridor through Armenia through
Meghri. Thoughts?
● Given that there are no diplomatic relations
between Azerbaijan and Armenia, how will passport control be done?
The resistance
movement held one protest in early August then announced a pause until Sep 2, the date of the next
major protest rally.
- Benyamin, what is your assessment of the
#ZartnirLao movement that started in April/May of this year? They obviously
didn’t reach their stated goal of ousting Pashinyan so far.
Apparently acting
independently, the former Ambassador of Armenia to Poland and former Chief of
Staff at the Constitutional Court in Armenia, has called for a rally tomorrow,
August 23, at 17:00. Edgar Ghazaryan was our guest in May, when we were
covering the resistance movement rallies.
● What do we know about Edgar Ghazaryan
specifically and your prognosis of the Armenian internal political situation?
That
was our Week in Review show, and we hope it helped you catch up with
some of the issues in and around Armenia from this past week. As always, we
invite your feedback and your suggestions. You can find us on most social media
and podcast platforms, or our website Groong.org.
Thanks
to Laura Osborn for the music on our podcasts. Don’t forget to subscribe to our
channel on YouTube, Like
our pages and follow us on social media. On behalf of everyone in this episode,
we wish you a good week, thanks for listening and we’ll talk to you next week.
Benyamin
Poghosyan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Russia, Surmalu,
Artsakh, Nagorno Karabakh, Iran, Surmalu Blast,
Explosion, Fireworks, Lachin, Berdzor, Aghavno,