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Introduction
Hello, and welcome to the
Armenian News Network, Groong, Week
in Review. This episode was recorded on Sunday, December 12, 2021. Here are the
topics we’ll discuss this week:
●
Zoom
for Democracy
○
What did Armenia’s participation in the “Summit
for Democracy” bring?
○
What was Moscow’s reaction to the summit? How
will Armenia’s participation impact its relations with Russia?
○
Was Armenia able to use this opportunity to
inform the world of Armenia’s interests or was it another missed opportunity?
●
Domestic
Politics
○
What were the results of the December 5
municipal elections?
○
Armenian opposition MPs released by the
Constitutional Court!
○
And,
another scandal this week, this time involving Nikol Pashinyan’s and Alen Simonyan’s
statements about Armenian POWs.
●
Regional
Politics
○
Continuing tension over Ukraine and Putin-Biden
summit on Ukraine: outcomes and impact for the region.
○
Aliyev ramps up his rhetoric and increases
tension on the border, demanding a corridor through Syunik.
○
Armenia participates in the “3+3” platform in
Moscow, while Georgia stays out.
●
Artsakh
Independence at 30
○
How did Armenian authorities mark the 30th
anniversary of Artsakh’s independence?
To unpack these issues, we have with us:
Benyamin Poghosyan, who is the Chairman of the Yerevan based think
tank Center for Political and Economic
Strategic Studies,
And
Pietro Shakarian,
who is a Lecturer in History at the
American University of Armenia in Yerevan. His research focuses on the history
of Soviet Armenia and the Caucasus.
Topics This Week
Zoom for Democracy
On December 9 and 10, prime minister Pashinyan
joined Joe Biden’s Summit for Democracy initiative. This was a remote summit
with leaders of over 100 countries summiting via Zoom.
From Armenia’s region, only Armenia and Georgia
were invited. Turkey, Azerbaijan, Russia, and Iran were excluded. Azerbaijan
was clearly displeased at being left out, and expressed
their official displeasure through editorials.
Other notable guests included Venezuelan opposition figure Juan Guaidó, Belarussian opposition figure in self-imposed exile
Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya,
and the unrecognized government of Taiwan!
China and Russia complained loudly
(unprecedentedly so) that the US is weaponizing the summit against them.
What was the purpose of this summit and are the
loud Russian/Chinese complaints mere propaganda or should their concerns be
taken seriously by countries who are participating in this endeavor, including
Armenia?
–
Can such a summit serve its purpose in the form
of a Zoom meeting?
In his address
at the summit Pashinyan chose to talk about his “velvet revolution”, successes
in elections and rejection of a “return to the ways of the past”. He even got
in a few sentences using buzz words such as “low-emissions” and “green
economy”.
Yet, there was no mention of authoritarian
Azerbaijan’s and Turkey’s violations of international law in last year’s war,
no mention of Azerbaijan’s continued use of prisoners as a tool for extortion
in violation of the Geneva convention, no complaints about their incursions
into Armenia and continued war of attrition in Syunik and Gegharkunik.
Why not use such a large forum, having the
audience of Biden, to push forward Armenia’s interests, and to spread awareness
about the threats to our national security coming from undemocratic neighbors?
Domestic Politics
Municipal Elections
Summary
On December 5, Armenia held municipal elections
in 36 communities across 9 of Armenia’s 12 marzes of
Aragatsotn, Ararat, Armavir, Gegharqunik, Lori, Kotayk,
Shirak, Vayots Dzor, and
Tavush. This was the largest municipal elections this year and thus gathered
the most focus, but there were two smaller scale elections in October and
November, which we covered.
The results themselves, well it is unclear and
even at an expert level we think its impossible to
make heads or tails! They’ve been spun by different parties in different ways:
●
Pro-government media celebrated the results as a
huge victory for the ruling party with Civil Contract outright winning in 24
out of 36 communities.
●
The opposition claims that the margin of the
victories by the ruling party is decreasing and that the ruling party didn’t
win in some of the larger and more critical battles.
Perhaps it makes sense to drill down into each
community and analyze the local dynamics that led to the results there, but
that is probably a topic of a separate show and there is adequate coverage of
it in Armenian media.
We’re interested in the overall trend and
results at the macro level.
Where was the national opposition?
What was really weird about these elections is
that the opposition at the national level, specifically the Hayastan Dashinq and Pativ Unem Dashinq, did not participate
in elections in the same blocs.
●
The ARF participated in only some municipalities
and even then, as part of different local electoral alliances. In elections
that it did take part in, the ARF didn’t score at the top and at best may be
part of an alliance:
●
The HHK/RPA didn’t officially participate but
individual politicians who are members of the HHK participated under different
electoral blocs.
What is the strategy of the national opposition?
And what is the deal with Firstname-Lastname
electoral blocs?
Notes:
ARF Performance in elections
(where it ran as an official party):
○ Ashtarak - Loss: It got only 15% (with Civil Contract getting 79%).
○ Artashat - Loss: Civil Contract swept here with 60% (with ARF getting only about 4%).
○ Metsamor - Loss: Civil Contract sweep with 79% (ARF got 21%).
○ Sevan - Loss: “Sargis Muradyan” Alliance sweep with 79% (ARF got 11%).
○ Tumanyan - Loss: Republic Party got majority with 51% (ARF got 5%).
○ Abovyan - Loss: Prosperous Armenia got 46% (with ARF getting 5%).
○ Hrazdan - Loss: Civil Contract sweep with 80% (with ARF getting 9%).
○ Nor Hachn - Loss: (“Gagik Matevosyan” alliance got 51%, ARF got 3%)
○ Nairi - No majority (most votes, 45%, garnered by “Reorganized Social Democratic Hnchakyan” party with ARF getting 5%)
○ Artik - No majority (Civil Contract got most votes - 42%, with ARF getting 5%)
○
In other communities individual ARF members ran
as part of other parties/coalitions. According
to Asbarez: “party
had at least one candidate running in 23 of 36”
HHK/RPA performance:
○
RPA member Mamikon Aslanyan (Vanadzor) participated under the name of “Mamikon Aslanyan Alliance”
receiving 38.7% of the vote (with Civil Contract getting 25.1%).
○
In Masis, David Hambartsumyan ran under the name “David Hambartsumyan
Alliance”, garnering 52.6% (with Civil Contract getting 47.4%)
Pashinyan says “democracy won”
But there were plenty of violations reported in
the news including:
●
Allegations of electoral-day fraud
●
Reports of use of administrative resources
(including work on laying
asphalt on elections day, in December, amidst rain and
mud).
The “Independent Observer” election monitoring
organization (run by Daniel Ioannisyan) has declared
the elections as free and fair.
Who is Daniel Ioannisyan
and is the Independent Observer’s election assessment trustworthy?
Opposition Parliamentarians Released
The Constitutional Court found the detention of
three Hayastan Alliance MPs anti-constitutional, and they were released.
This is another setback for the government in
the high court and essentially confirms what the opposition is claiming that
the justice system (which finally corrected itself) is essentially strongly
compliant with the wishes of the party in power.
In all stages of the process, starting from the
ordinary prosecutor, law enforcement and judiciary officials sided with the
government in an apparent attempt to pressure the opposition. Granted, the
opposition parliamentarians were finally released, but this still means that
the government enjoys the ability to pressure its enemies by sending them to
jail for months at a time without major deterrence.
What’s the implication of this loss by the
government in the constitutional court?
At the same time Ishkhan
Zakaryan is quitting
the opposition Pativ Unem
faction and will continue serving as an independent lawmaker. Earlier in
November, it was reported that the government had
opened a criminal case against Ishkan
Zakaryan leading the opposition to decry another case
of the ruling party using law enforcement to pressure opposition. Opposition
sources also allege that the opening of this criminal case is illegal since Zakaryan (similar to the three MPs who were released)
enjoys parliamentary immunity.
Why didn’t Zakaryan
simply lay down his mandate (allowing his faction to propose another member)?
Why did the opposition put him on the list of candidates in the first place
(shouldn’t they have known that he’d be vulnerable)? What’s the implication of
the opposition having 1 less vote? Does this mean that the ruling party would
have a constitutional super-majority?
Prisoners Politicized?
It seems
that there is not a week in Armenia without a major political scandal. This
week, it was Alen Simonyan again.
In a leaked
video which appeared on the Internet on December 8, Simonyan
is seen making eyebrow-raising remarks regarding Armenian prisoners held in
Baku. He insinuates that at least in the case of Nov. 16 mini-war, the
prisoners voluntarily turned themselves in and are guilty of desertion. He also
made a statement that for him the prisoners “no longer exist” if it means that we would lose Syunik
or Kapan for their sake.
Simonyan responded that the leaked video was
edited and quoted him out of context, and provided a full version of the video, which still confirmed what the leaked
video had shown: his lack of empathy or respect for Armenian soldiers,
veterans, POWs.
The
discussion on whether Armenian POWs were guilty of desertion was in fact
initiated by Nikol Pashinyan himself last on Nov 18
in parliament when he said: “I think it is time for us to investigate
every case of captivity properly, because every soldier serving in the Armed
Forces of the Republic of Armenia has responsibilities. Perhaps we have been
wrong in this because of the emotional background, but all cases must be
clearly examined. What does it mean to be taken prisoner? Under what
circumstances?”
And, these
public statements were followed up by actual criminal cases the following day, against 5 of the 10
prisoners that were returned to Armenia on December 4.
Pashinyan’s and Simonyan’s
statements (and subsequent criminal cases) drew widespread condemnation from
human rights groups.
Could
Armenia have handled this issue better, even if we assume that some of the
prisoners were in fact deserters?
Follow-up
questions:
● Alen Simonyan
seems to have generalized heavily insinuating that all prisoners were
deserters. Siranush Sahakyan, a prominent human
rights lawyer, warned that such public statements (and public
prosecution) could be used by Azerbaijan to convince the prisoners to not
return to Armenia (even if they’re not guilty). Do you agree with this?
● There were reports that Armenian soldiers
were under orders not to shoot. Why then, not allow for presumption of
innocence, why accuse prisoners publicly as a high ranking official (which
could put pressure on investigators) and why generalize (when a criminal case
was opened only against some of them)?
● Especially concerning the Nov. 16
mini-war, videos appeared where Azerbaijani soldiers were casually marching,
apparently without any obstruction, towards Armenian positions. Even if we
assume that Armenian soldiers turned themselves in, HOW on earth could Azeri
soldiers be able to pass so easily? Why didn’t we mine the fuck
out of the place?
Regional Politics
Tension continues over Ukraine
Today in Liverpool, the G7 issued a sharp
warning to Moscow that there will be “massive
consequences” if it invades or commits “aggression” against Ukraine. The UK’s
Foreign Secretary Liz Truss warned that all economic sanctions were on the
table. The group also praised
Ukraine’s “restraint” and reaffirmed its “unwavering commitment to Ukraine’s
sovereignty and territorial integrity, as well as the right of any sovereign
state to determine its own future [which presumably includes membership in
NATO].” For its part, Moscow denies that it intends to invade Ukraine and says
that the West is gripped by “Russophobia.”
Today’s statement is just the latest example of
the escalating tension between Moscow and the West (especially Washington) over
Ukraine. Amid this environment, on Tuesday, US President Biden and Russian
President Putin engaged in a “high stakes” video call. The call lasted two
hours. According
to the New York Times,
both American and Russian officials described the meeting “as tense but
occasionally pierced by humor.” Biden said that there would be “harsh economic
penalties” for Russia if it attacked Ukraine and that it would “lead NATO to
reposition its troops in Europe.” The New
York Times has noted that, according to Biden, such measures “go well
beyond the West’s response to Russia’s annexation of Crimea seven years ago.”
How will the rising tension between Russia and
the US over Ukraine impact the Caucasus and Armenia’s position in the region?
Sochi to Brussels via Ultimatums
After meeting in
Sochi on November 26 the sides made various
statements that they had agreed to advance various points of the November 2020
Agreement within 10 days or so. Ilham Aliyev then demanded that Armenia provide
a date for opening what he calls the “Zangezur
Corridor”, to which the Armenian government responded that “corridor logic” was
not part of the agreement.
The statements were swiftly followed by another mini-war this week, with the Azerbaijani army firing on Armenian positions in Gegharkunik (Verin Shorja). The result after a day of violence left 1 dead, and 8 injured, with 6 in serious condition.
We’ve already talked about Azerbaijan’s strategy to make life in Artsakh and the borders miserable for Armenians. What astounds us is the deep military un-readiness of Armenia.
Meanwhile, in preparation for the
Pashinyan-Aliyev meeting in Brussels this coming week, the OSCE MG countries
made an announcement by their foreign ministers.
○
Missing praise of Russian peacekeepers
○
No mention of Artsakh status and former basic
principles (non-use of force, self-determination, territorial integrity)
The statement shows more about the deep divide
between Russia and the West, is there anything we can glean about the Brussels
meeting?
What’s to be expected? Except for Belgian
waffles.
3+3? 3+2? 666?
This past week Deputy Foreign Minister Vahe Gevorgyan attended the Turkish-proposed and so-called “3+3” platform for the discussion of regional
problems. It’s supposed to be Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, as well as regional
powers Iran, Russia and Turkey. However, Georgia has
been clear from the start that they will not participate. So, the platform has
been alternately called the 3+2.
In any
case, Armenia has indicated that it would participate if this platform is not
used to discuss issues that are also being discussed in the OSCE MG process, or
the Trilateral Armenia-Azerbaijan-Russia post-war process.
What good
can come out of this platform? Why is Armenia accepting to participate, what’s
in it for Armenia?
What’s in
this process for Russia? While The West is in overdrive promoting its “Russia
is about to invade Ukraine” discourse, Russia seems to be bending over
backwards to avoid any wars or violent conflicts, especially with Turkey.
Question: Why is Georgia staying out of this platform?
Notes:
●
At the level of deputy FMs
●
Follows news from a few weeks ago where Armenia
said that it sought Russia’s help in establishing relations with Turkey.
●
Let’s remember Turkey’s preconditions:
○
Artsakh status (forget about it)
○
Accept/affirm treaty of Kars
○
Forget genocide recognition as a state policy
○
Most recently: “zangezur
corridor”?
●
Does this mean that Armenia has agreed to
Turkey’s preconditions?
EAEU Summit
●
Nazarbayev said
he’d like to see AZ as an observer
●
Pashinyan’s
speech followed Nazarbayev’s. He highlighted
many priorities for Armenia and the EAEU, but he didn’t address this statement.
30th Anniversary of Artsakh Republic’s
Independence
On December 10, the Artsakh Republic celebrated
the 30th anniversary of the referendum that cemented its claim to
self-determination and independence as the Republic of Nagorno Karabakh
declared upon the territory of the former Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO)
within the Soviet Union. Artsakh president Arayik
Harutyunyan addressed
his country and affirmed the republic’s goals to seek full independence,
security, and recovery of territories of Artsakh proper which were lost to Azerbaijan
during the 44-day war.
The Armenian government made no statements on
this anniversary. It simply published an article containing the full text of
Harutyunyan’s address.
The Armenian people spent thirty years
struggling, suffering individually and collectively as victims of blockade and
aggression by Azerbaijan and Turkey. The war and conflict has
touched every single Armenian home in one way or another. And individually many
Armenians continue to carry this fight every day, but what does it say when the
state is silent? Can 30 years be undone just like that?
Topics from the Panelists
1. Pietro on American foreign policy elites who become scribes for Turkey and Azerbaijan.
2. Benyamin on Artsakh as the shield for Armenians in the Caucasus.
Wrap-up
That was our Week in Review
show, and we hope it helped you catch up with some of the issues in and around
Armenia from this past week. As always, we invite your feedback and your
suggestions. You can find us on most social media and podcast platforms, or our
website Groong.org.
Thanks to Laura Osborn for
the music on our podcasts. Don’t forget to subscribe to our channel on Youtube, Like our pages and follow us on social media. On behalf of
everyone in this episode, we wish you a good week, thanks for listening and
we’ll talk to you next week.
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Keywords
Benyamin Poghosyan, Pietro Shakarian,
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Nagorno Karabakh, Artsakh, Nikol
Pashinyan, Ilham Aliyev, Vladimir Putin, Joe Biden, Summit for Democracy, Zoom,
Georgia, South Caucasus, Turkey, Russia, Iran, Ukraine, NATO, Turkmenistan,
Communication channels, Corridors, Borders, Peace Negotiations, Politics,
Turkmen Gas, Caspian,