Armenian
News Network / Groong
Conversations on Groong: with Vahram Ter-Matevosyan
Hello
and welcome to the Armenian News Network, Groong,
This
episode was recorded on Sunday, September 11, 2022.
In
this Conversations on Groong
episode, we’re going to discuss Prof. Vahram Ter-Matevosyan and Hovannes
Nikoghosyan’s recent research paper titled From ‘revolution’ to war:
deciphering Armenia’s populist foreign policy-making process.
For this, we are
joined by one of the co-authors:
|
Prof. Vahram Ter-Matevosyan, who is
an associate Professor and Chair of the Political Science and International
Affairs Program at AUA. His research interests focus on Turkish politics, Kemalism,
Political Islam & Security in the South Caucasus. |
|
Recently, you and
your colleague Hovhannes Nikoghosyan
published a paper in Taylor and Francis Online (TANDF) that analyzes the
foreign policy decision making (FPDM) of the Nikol
Pashinyan administration.
Q:
Can you tell us how you came up with the idea for this research topic and why
it is important to interested readers?
Q:
The level of detail in this paper reminds us that Armenia never set up an
independent commission to analyze the 44-day war and its outcome. Could your
research be rolled into such an analytical review of a commission’s work?
Q:
You summarize Pashinyan’s administration to date into three distinct phases:
Can you summarize
these categories, and the turning points?
(Note: the
“invincibility of democratic credentials”, etc)
In the paper, you
try to show two contrasting phenomena, that of populism (which is on a rise
around the world) and that of mature and pragmatic policymaking in Armenia. In
the abstract of the paper, for instance, you write that the “incoherent and
erratic nature of” policy caused “unprecedented wreckage” of Armenia’s national
security architecture.”
Defenders of
Pashinyan claim that the trajectory towards war and the outcome we have now was
set in motion many years ago by Pashinyan’s predecessors.
Q:
Do you agree that the coming of the war and its outcome was predetermined by
Pashinyan’s predecessors? If so, how? What agency did Pashinyan and his team
have to prevent or at least minimize its disastrous outcome?
One specific aspect
of the war, which I believe served a decisive role, was Turkey’s involvement in
the war. In fact, in my opinion, Turkey really didn’t even need to be
physically involved (but of course it was). Just by sharing with Azerbaijan
accurate NATO signals and satellite intelligence in the form of targets to
destroy, is decisive in my opinion.
Paying attention
and estimating Turkey’s willingness to intervene on behalf of Azerbaijan would
be critical for Armenia’s leadership. We of course have seen different members
of the Pashinyan team assure the press and public, even weeks before the war,
that Turkey would not dare intervene.
Q:
Have you looked at this aspect of Armenia’s foreign policy? What did
Pashinyan’s team do (or perhaps didn’t do) in this area to accurately assess
the risk of intervention from Turkey and to put mitigations to counter this
risk?
Follow-ups:
● Was there any specific contact with Turkey in
the run-up to Sep 2020?
● How critical were Pashinyan’s and Armen
Sarkissian’s statements on the 100th anniversary of Treaty of
Sevres?
Many, especially
those in the pro-Pashinyan camp today, blame Russia for throwing Armenia under
the bus for better relations with Turkey.
Questions:
● What was the conduct of Pashinyan’s foreign
policy with Russia like, preceding and during the war?
● Are the claims that Russia deceived Armenia
correct? Did Russia in recent years ever send a signal to Armenia that it would
help defend Artsakh?
Turning to
relations with Azerbaijan, many of the analysts we have talked to state that it
was pretty much obvious that Aliyev was gearing up for war starting from 2011
when he effectively rejected the peace deal being considered at the time.
It is apparent
that Azerbaijan also bid its time, preparing militarily but also tactically
selecting a suitable period in time. In 2020, the world was preoccupied with
Covid and in the US it was election season, as well as a period of near
isolationism from foreign involvements in the Trump administration.
Q:
Despite the external factors, was there anything that Armenia did bilaterally
with Azerbaijan that could have delayed the war or helped change its outcome?
For instance, in the paper you talk about the infamous Dushanbe elevator
meeting, where Pashinyan and Aliyev are alleged to have agreed to not fire at
each other on the border and allow Pashinyan to consolidate power internally.
That
was our show and we hope you found it helpful. We invite
your feedback and your suggestions. You can find
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Thanks
to Laura Osborn for the music on our podcasts. On behalf of everyone in this
episode, we thank you for listening. Stay well, we’ll be back next week.
Vahram
Ter-Matevosyan, Hovannes Nikoghosyan, Armenia,
Artsakh, Nagorno Karabakh, Populism, Populist Leader, Azerbaijan, 44-day war,
Foreign Policy Decision Making, FPDM, Security Council, National Assembly,
Parliament, Prime Minister Office, Francophonie, Democratic Credentials, Nikol Pashinyan,
