Armenian
News Network / Groong
Conversations on Groong: Turkish-Armenian Normalization
Hello
and welcome to the Armenian News Network, Groong,
today we will be talking about the Turkish-Armenian Normalization process in
progress between the two countries and potential impact on the Armenia-Diaspora
relations.
This
episode was recorded on Friday, January 7, 2022.
One of the
outcomes of the capitulation agreement that Armenia signed to end the 44-Day
War was that it committed to unblocking “all economic and transport connections in the region”,
primarily referring to opening communication links through its territory
between mainland Azerbaijan and Nakhichevan.
Events
following the November 9 Agreement indicate that Armenia is working towards a
larger regional plan that includes normalization of relations with Turkey as
well as establishing a final peace deal with Azerbaijan. The Armenian
government claims that it has received such a mandate from Armenian voters as a
result of the June 20, 2021, parliamentary elections.
Obviously,
Turkey’s blockade of Armenia shortly after Armenia gained independence in 1991
and the lack of diplomatic relations between them is a major obstacle to
fulfilling Pashinyan’s goal of bringing an “era of
peace in the region”. To this effect, we’ve seen attempts by Turkey and Armenia
to normalize relations following the war. Both countries have appointed envoys
to work towards this goal.
To talk about
these issues, we are joined by:
|
Harut Sassounian, who has been the publisher of The California
Courier newspaper since 1983. He is also the President of the Armenia Artsakh
Fund, a non-profit organization which has delivered to Armenia and Artsakh
$947 million of humanitarian assistance since 1989. He is currently engaged
in forming the Diaspora Armenian Parliament through local elections. |
|
In
fact, Armenia has already been around this block before. All three of Pashinyan’s predecessors have attempted to improve
relations with Turkey, without success. Levon Ter-Petrosyan attempted to open relations in the early 90s, but
Turkey stopped the process after Armenia’s successes in the first Artsakh War,
specifically the capture of Kelbajar in 1993. During
Kocharyan’s first term, the so-called “Turkish-Armenian Reconciliation
Commission” (TARC) was launched under the guidance of the US State Dept. The
commission issued non-binding recommendations to the sides and ceased activity
in 2004, without any apparent impact to the normalization process. During Serzh
Sargsyan presidency the two countries kicked the ball around for a while during
“Football Diplomacy”, but the game was aborted without results. The
Armenia-Turkey protocols were signed in 2009, but neither country’s parliament
ratified them.
So
here we are again.
Harut, neither of the two countries is about to pack
up and leave the planet, so they do need to talk to each other and have some
form of relationship. So, nobody’s against having relations, would you agree?
Who
are the players?
● Turkey has appointed one of its top diplomats,
Serdar Kiliç as its lead negotiator. What can you
tell us about him? What does his appointment signal to Armenians?
● Armenia has appointed Ruben Rubinyan,
who is a loyalist of PM Pashinyan. Why was he selected for this role? What
signal is Armenia sending with this appointment?
Is
opening the border with Turkey an obligation logically following from the
November Agreement, as some media have reported? Or are these separate things?
Why
now? Is this a good time for Turkey and Armenia to reboot their relationship?
What
is the agenda of these Normalization negotiations?
● What is included? What should be included and is
not?
● What is excluded? What should be excluded and is
not?
Is
there a difference between the former attempts at building this relationship,
and the current Normalization negotiations?
● Why did TARC fail? Why did Football Diplomacy
fail?
● What are the lessons we should bring forward
from former experiences to the current negotiations?
Assuming
that all sides are approaching this process with their national interests as
their paramount concern, what are some of the key pitfalls and also
opportunities presented to Armenia here?
● We’ve heard speculation by the Armenian
government about the economic boom that is likely to result from opening the
border and trading with Turkey. Most non-governmental expectations are much
more circumspect.
A
third of the worldwide Armenian nation lives in the Republic of Armenia.
Two-thirds live in the DIaspora. A vast component of
the Armenian DIaspora was formed as a result of the
Armenian Genocide. You’re a descendent of survivor grandparents, as are both
Hovik and I.
The
independent Republic of Armenia is a member of the community of states and has
access to international legal levers and resources. The Armenian Diaspora does
not.
● Is Armenia an appropriate or even an adequate
representative of the Diaspora’s demands for Genocide recognition, and
reparation during these negotiations?
● Can the Diaspora’s agenda be separated from the
Republic’s agenda, as far as what should be in these negotiations?
● Does the Diaspora have legal, or even adequate
representatives to stand for its interests in negotiating with a state entity?
That
concludes this Conversations On Groong episode.
As always we invite your feedback, Thanks to Laura
Osborn for the music on our podcasts. Don’t forget to subscribe to our channel
on YouTube, Like
our pages and follow us on Twitter. On behalf of everyone in this episode, we
wish you a good week, thanks for listening and we’ll talk to you soon.
Harut Sassounian, Armenia, Turkey, Turkish Armenian Normalization, Turkish Armenian Reconciliation, Serdar Kiliç, Rouben Rubinyan, Armenian Genocide, South Caucasus, Nakhichevan, Syunik, Zangezur, Transportation Links, Communication Links, Corridors, Economy, Azerbaijan, War, Kars, Gyumri, Railway, Trains,
